A U.S.-China War over Taiwan: How Bad Could It Get?

Conservative News DailyJanuary 24, 2023

Beware, China. Taiwan, Asia and America. The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies gathered a team to visit the area just after the holidays. released A substantial amount report This entry Wargaming the Chinese Invasion of Taiwan: First Battle of the Next War. It is packed with everything you need. insight. It is hoped that it will be read avidly by the uniformed service, their political masters and Congress.

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The report describes the design and the results of an unclassified game that was held in Taiwan Strait, 2026. This is near the end of the much discussed. “Davidson window,” The report predicts that China could attack Taiwan by 2027. The game overseers ran twenty-four iterations, changing different variables—political and strategic decisions, alliance politics, strategy and operations, weaponry and sensors available to the combatants—to identify cross-cutting themes, and to compile findings and recommendations applicable across a variety of likely circumstances.

Overall, the CSIS game was more positive than the games of the armed forces which tend to predict bitter defeat. The First Battle of the Next War observes that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generally lost or fought to a stalemate under most plausible scenarios. The coauthors attribute the disparity between think-tank and Pentagon games to the fact that the CSIS hosts factored history into the game’s conduct alongside more traditional statistical methods.

It is a smart move to bring in non-quantitative methods. Military sage Carl von Clausewitz warns Do not try to reduce complexity and messiness like warfare to rules or formulas. It is like following Clausewitzian advice and relying too heavily on the likelihood of a kill in an exchange of fire using certain weapons or sensors.

History is a powerful antidote for focusing on numbers.

The three most important themes in the report are that Taiwan must take control of its defense, not depend on outside intervention. To succeed, the U.S. armed force must seek permission from Japan to operate out of U.S. bases in Japan. Additionally, the U.S. military must beef up its magazine for air-launched Anti-ship Ordnance in order to sink a PLA Naval amphibious taskforce trying to cross Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan will be thrown into disarray. The island and its protectors won’t be able to focus enough firepower at the right time and place to win.

The first chapters of The First Battle of the Next War They are fascinating, but they do not focus on actionable lessons. Halfway through the report, the coauthors look at the game results and their recommendations. That’s where makers and executors—and funders—of strategy should concentrate their attention.

Coauthors also urge Washington, for instance, to mobilize the armed forces of the United States and prepare American society for the reality of great-power warfare. It is important to do this ahead of time. They are correct in saying that no cross-strait warfare will be a pushbutton, antiseptic affair. It will be bloodyThey are also costly. The consequences of these losses can be devastating. The U.S. Navy lost on average two vessels. aircraft carriers You can choose from between ten- to twenty major surface fighters depending on the version of the game. Aircraft losses These were traumatizing, as were the casualties of aviators, mariners and soldiers.

Most likely, life will mirror gaming.

In other words, it’s worth disabusing service folk and American citizens of the notion that the United States, its allies, and Taiwan can score a quick, decisive victory in the Taiwan Strait. That assumption is what we’ve grown accustomed to since the Soviet Union’s demise. America’s post-Cold War era of martial supremacy—and easy triumphs over outmatched foes—has come to a close. History is back. Senior commanders and statesmen should now be able to teach the U.S. government and the people the basics of warfare.

Let’s zero in on a couple of critical points from the report. Surprisingly, the report mentions one weapon system over and over again, namely the AGM-158B Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER). The report doesn’t quite tout the JASSM-ER as a war-winning capability. It is, however, close.

Here’s why. The JASSM -ER precision strike weapon is designed for air to ground missions. Officially, it has a range estimated at 575 miles. That’s standoff range, beyond the reach of PLA Navy ships’ defenses. The U.S. Air Force also has a large stock of this lethal missile. By 2026, the air arm will have an estimated 3,650. The newfangled AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile LRASM, a JASSM -ER derivative that is optimized for shipkilling is not available in Navy and Air Force inventories. (At present, the Air Force B-1B bombers as well as Navy F/A-18 fighter/attack aircrafts are certified to tote LRASMs.

The numbers are shocking. In 2026, the services will have 450 LRASMs. That’s a shallow magazine for fighting a peer competitor. Software necromancy can allow the air and sea to increase their inventory of air-launched shipskillers. The coauthors note that the U.S. Navy leadership requested funding for JASSM-ERs in its budget request for fiscal year 2022, justifying the request in part to augment the sea service’s capability for offensive anti-surface-warfare missions. That is, to fight against surfare warfareships.

Evidently a software upgrade can give the JASSM-ER an anti-ship capability that duplicates—to some extent, anyway—the destructive potential of the purpose-built LRASM.

If this were to happen, the JASSM -ER would be a powerful force multiplier for U.S. and allied Anti-ship Arsenals. In effect, it would add thousands of antiship munitions onto the stockpile. A fighting force’s ability to engage in more combative operations is dependent on its missile magazine. The longer they can continue operating, the greater the missile range. And the more engagements it undertakes, the better its chances of pummeling a hostile force—such as, say, a Chinese invasion fleet making its way to Taiwan—into scrap.

The CSIS wargame was not classified. Therefore, the coauthors are unsure if the JASSM -ER is suitable for seaborne missions and how many missiles it will be repurposed in 2026. Part of the mystery surrounding the JASSM–ER-to–LRASM transformation may be deliberate. Military magnates are often very specific about the details of sensors and weapons. While they are able to disclose enough information to deter and discomfit potential foes, they remain vague about technical characteristics in order to deny rivals an accurate understanding of U.S. arms should war break out.

Coauthors believe that the JASSM ER will have some anti-ship capability by 2026. Some will also have been converted to sea service. They also tried other variants of the game, which yielded sobering results. These scenarios resulted in the allies running out of standoff LRASMs quickly and they had to resort short-range weapons. That meant firing platforms had to close within reach of PLA Navy ships’ anti-air missiles. As the Chinese stepped up their defenses, losses of allies combat aircraft increased.

Lastly, it’s worth commenting on the report’s odd-seeming title: The First Battle. The coauthors suggest that the wargame may only have covered one phase in the ongoing struggle for Taiwan. Even learned commentators sometimes oversimplify Clausewitz’s observations on how wars end, contending that he says “the outcome is never final.” No. However, the Prussian master states that “even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final” (my emphasis). That’s because “the defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”

The defeated can challenge the verdict of war. But a challenge isn’t a sure thing.

A lasting victory in Taiwan Strait is possible. It is worth striving for, should China attempt an amphibian invasion across the strait. But these strategic and geographic facts will not be forgotten. All combatants would be defeated if war broke out, even the civilians. China. China and Taiwan will not be moving anywhere. Beijing could attempt to rematch the match at a more favorable time and it has a tremendous weight on the island. It’s willing to pay a great price for its goals. It is not certain that the United States or other Taiwanese friends would agree to periodic rematches. China may lose this round, according to the CSIS game. This may not mean the end of the story. Make sure you plan accordingly.

Take the time to read it all.

Experience and Expertise as an Author: Dr. James Holmes The J. C. Wylie Chair in Maritime Strategy at U.S. Naval War College, and a Nonresident Fellow at Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare Marine Corps University. These views are solely his. Holmes is also a 19FortyFive Contributing editor.