Will M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 Tanks Win the War for Ukraine?

Conservative News DailyJanuary 25, 2023

This is part 1 of a trilogy. You can find part I here here. Last Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked For the many air defense missiles and armored personnel carriers that their leaders promised to provide during a meeting in Ramstein (Germany), they will. But “hundreds of ‘thank yous’ are not hundreds of tanks,” he said, urging a speedy delivery of modern tanks to his country’s forces. The Wall Street Journal on Tuesday reported Zelensky might soon be able to get what he wants in the shape of U.S. M1 Abrams The other is the German Leopard 2.

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However, the larger question is whether tanks that arrive on the battlefield will prove decisive.

It seems that Kyiv and the Western capitals believe that Ukraine will be given if it is given. modern NATO tanks, the war on the ground will turn in Ukraine’s favor. For simple reasons, these optimists will likely be disappointed.

The hard truth, as this analysis will show, is that grafting even modern Abrams and Leopard tanks into Zelensky’s forces presents almost as many challenges as it does opportunities.

The tanks are unlikely to change the war’s dynamic.

Why Tanks Are Not a Slam Dunk

Even if Germany Finally, European countries are allowed to release many 2,000 of their nationals Leopard 2 tanks, as now appears likelyIt will take months for them to arrive in Ukraine. They also need to be trained and ready to deploy tanks on the battlefield. The task of effectively using the tanks will be harder. Not only will the Ukrainian Armed Forces have to train on NATO tanks, but also on many other tanks and supporting armored vehicles.

Zelensky’s troops will not have a few classes of complementary vehicle classes, but myriad different platforms. They will bring many unique engines, different types of weapon systems, unique firecontrol systems, logistics requirements, and specific maintenance requirements. Problematic in the building of combat power is that Ukraine must figure out a way to create coherent units from its chaotic mix of troops and platforms. Many of these troops are not familiar with mobile or mechanized warfare.

There is already a high degree of variation in Ukraine’s army of Soviet tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and howitzers. These tanks are used in conjunction with a wide range of howitzers. U.S. platforms Such as Vietnam-era M113 personnel carrier, MRAP armored trucks and Humvees M117 scout carsOther variants. We should also remember the untold number of Polish IFVs, Turkish Kirpi Armored trucks Canadian Senator Swedish personnel carriers, and armored personnel carrier CV90 infantry vehicles Survive on the battlefield

A wide variety of weapons from different countries may seem like a good thing to the casual observer. It might be as easy as splitting the capabilities between different units in order to make sure everyone has some of the best equipment. Each unit will benefit. However, as someone who has been involved in large-scale tank battles I can tell you that dealing with multiple weapons systems is a significant issue with important operational implications.

Take into account that the vast majority U.S. Army’s armored personnel carriers (and infantry fighting vehicles) are variations of two types of vehicle: the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV and the Stryker armored combat vehicle. There are many options for each platform. Each one is tailored to specific missions. However, the operating, functioning and maintenance requirements of each platform are largely the same.

American troopers and their support personnel need to be able operate the two armored vehicle types and know how to supply ammunition, maintenance, and supply requirements. The U.S. forces have two main systems for tanks: the M1 Abrams Stryker and his family Mobile Gun System. There are two primary IFV types for U.S. Army Soldiers, and two primary tank types. (Jeff Jager wrote an excellent description These pages provide an example of how U.S.BFV units are constructed.

Training needs

Instead, we ask Ukraine, which is locked in a life and death struggle with an invading Russian arm, to be proficient with seven Western IFV type types and seven classes Soviet-made infantry vehicle. This would have serious consequences for the system and create nightmares.

In Washington’s latest package of war support, the U.S. has given Ukraine will receive a total of 109 BFVs along with 90 Stryker cars, and Germany has committed to provide the remaining 109. 40 Marder armored vehicles. They are enough to equip three infantry battalions. But let’s say that the UAF divides the vehicles so that three battalions each have at least some modern BFVs and three with Marders, to go along with the types of vehicle fleets Ukraine currently uses.

To be effective in fighting, each battalion must have some soldiers trained on how to operate Bradley or Marder vehicles. Others will need to learn how to operate Soviet-era ships. In truth, however, it won’t just be a U.S./German and Soviet-era system that will have to be in place.

It’s much messier and more complicated than that: it is likely that in any given infantry unit there will also be a mix of Soviet-era vehicles, and other vehicles from any number of different countries.

There are no logistics or maintenance systems in place for BFVs and Marders in the Ukrainian Army. Even basic repairs may require the evacuation of the vehicle to Poland, as is the case currently. repairing artillery It is also damaged in Ukraine. This state of affairs negatively affects a unit’s combat potential.

I was in the tank battle of 73 Easting During Operation Desert Storm, I witnessed how armored cars often failed to function and needed simple repairs. My vehicle had a blown engine. There were mobile repair shops that we had available to us. Staffed by veterans with years of training in armored vehicles and tanks, they were well-stocked with all the necessary parts.

Many times, our vehicles would be down for very minor problems and were able to be brought back online in a matter of hours. Even my armored fire support vehicle’s blown engine was repaired within 24 hours. It is difficult to make repairs in combat conditions, but it is possible for the U.S. Army, as it is an integral part of our unit organization. But for Ukraine, even a minor mechanical problem could deadline the tank or IFV, requiring it to be towed back to Poland for repairs – and there certainly won’t be spare engines available. Even with their new training, the UAF is likely to have real problems keeping these new fleets in operation.

It is a far more difficult battle than I experienced in the Middle East and in Germany during training exercises. Ukraine, according to all accounts, is a great country. suffers significant casualties. If the UAF takes the offensive, the casualties rate will rise, especially in key battles. What happens if the Bradley’s crewmen get wounded in battle? Do they need to be evacuated or are they rescued?

Who will then operate the equipment? Who will fire – without prior training – the BFV’s complex 25mm main gun, its missile launcher, or its onboard machine guns? The benefit of having modern NATO gear is that it is sophisticated and lethal – but the downside is that it also requires considerable training to operate and dedicated maintenance to keep it in the fight. Many of these systems are difficult to understand and are not easily understood. “picked up” By the next man in line.

The UAF are being asked to learn and train on potentially a dozen or more types of IFVs and multiple tank variants, being required to deal with the maintenance challenges, fuel requirements, different ammunition and fire control systems – while fighting daily for their lives. It is very unlikely that in mere months from now the Ukrainian army – or even a Western army for that matter – will be able to fall in on a hodge podge of equipment it has never seen and had limited training, for which it has no existing system of logistics or maintenance, and launch an effective large-scale and successful counteroffensive against an entrenched enemy.

This series will reveal that it would take nearly a year to create such a force. While there is some risk in delaying an offensive until next autumn or early 2024, the UAF may take greater risks by rushing their troops into an offensive that they do not have adequate training or support systems. As we say often in the U.S Army, they shouldn’t. “rush to fail.”

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Expertise & Experience 1945 Contributing editor Daniel L. Davis A Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities, he is also a former Lt. Col. of the U.S. Army and was deployed in combat zones four different times. He is the author “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis.