North Korea’s Growing ICBM Threat: How America and South Korea Should Respond

The Increasing Threat of North Korean ICBMs will exacerbate Allied Concerns In a recent military parade, Pyongyang It has produced the most number of multi-warhead ICBMs ever Displayed Unveiled and at once New solid-fueled ICBM. North Korea’s steadily expanding long-range missile arsenal The American homeland is at risk of being overwhelmed by the small number of ground-based interceptors. This, in turn will increase allied concerns that Washington might not be able to defend against North Korean aggression if confronted by a credible nuke threat from the regime.

North Korea’s New ICBMs

Parade celebrating the 75th birthday on Feb. 8.^Th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army, Pyongyang revealed at least 11 Hwasong-17 missiles, the world’s largest road-mobile ICBM. Experts estimate that the missile can carry between three and four nuclear warheads after it was successfully flown in November 2022. This number of multiple-warhead missiles, along with North Korea’s other ICBMs, could inundate the 44 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska and California. According to U.S. officials, they plan to fire multiple, sometimes upto four interceptors at each warhead.

North Korea also unveiled a containerized missile, which is most likely the prototype for a solid fuel ICBM. This goal was set by North Korean leaders. Kim Jong-un During January 2021 speech. Pyongyang successfully tested a solid-fuel rocket engine last December 2022.http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/5423e068147b92829b052588227b402d.kcmsf”>announced It was capable of generating a thrust of 140 ton of force, which is more than any other weapon. U.S., Russian or Chinese ICBM. Solid-fueled missiles take less time to launch and are therefore easier to spot and target.

North Korea’s ability to hold numerous American cities at risk of attack by hydrogen bombs has aggravated allies’ doubts about U.S. capability, resolve, and willingness to defend their countries. South Koreans are increasingly questioning the strength, commitment and willingness of the U.S. extended-deterrence guarantee. They wonder if the U.S. would respond. “willing to trade San Francisco for Seoul” Or if it would rather abandon its ally.

Current and former South Korean officials privately express concern that the 2024 U.S. presidential election could lead to an isolationist administration that downgrades America’s alliance commitments, perceives the military relationship in transactional terms, and threatens to reduce or remove U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula while unilaterally terminating combined military exercises and rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets.

January 2023 President Yoon Suk Yeol Numerous nuclear-related statements Yoon made were inconsistent with his previous positions, U.S. foreign policy and ongoing bilateral talks. Yoon seemed to mock U.S. extended defense. “the U.S. telling us not to worry because it will take care of everything. But now, it’s difficult to convince our people with just that.”

Yoon later suggested that South Korea could build its own missiles if North Korea’s threat becomes worse. Your nuclear weapons. The Administraton subsequently walked back Yoon’s comments, but that did not quell widespread media speculation of shifts in South Korean policy. 

South Korean polls indicate high (over) satisfaction. 70 percentPublic support for an indigenous program to develop nuclear weapons. Only 51 percent In late 2022, a majority of Koreans polled believed that the United States would extend deterrence to protect Seoul in the event of hostilities on Korea’s Peninsula.

Washington has taken steps in order to address South Korean concerns regarding the strength of the U.S. Extended Deterrence Guarantee. For the first time in four year, the U.S. began large-scale joint military exercises and rotational deployments of nuclear-capable assets to the Korean Peninsula. This included the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carriers and B52 bombers. Washington Promised to enhance These deployments are done in a routine, timely and coordinated manner.

Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense, and Lee Jong-sup, Minister of National Defense, have pledged their support Further strengthening the alliance’s military capabilities and readiness through information sharing, training, exercises, and consultation, as well as joint planning and execution, to deter and respond to North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile threats.

Two table-top exercises, simulating North Korean events, will be held by South Korea and the U.S. Nuclear weapons U.S. strategy for nuclear assets and strategic asset responses to North Korean threats, imminent nuclear attacks, and nuclear attack scenarios.

However, South Korean concerns still remain despite all the measures taken. Washington must establish a comprehensive strategy for pragmatic nuclear policy, enhanced nuclear coordination with allies, strong military capabilities, and persuasive communications of resolve to both its enemies and allies.

What’s Next

Washington should consider what additional measures could be taken to increase reassurance and press South Korea for specific recommendations. Seoul has not yet offered specific measures to alleviate its worries.

South Korea and the United States should establish a bilateral mechanism to coordinate extended deterrence policies. This includes nuclear planning, options and contingencies as well as combined exercises and the deployment of U.S. military assets. It is necessary to define procedures for South Korea’s inclusion in crisis decision-making regarding the potential use of U.S. nukes.

While the U.S. could designate and empower an existing bilateral group as a nuclear consultative group, it seems that South Korea would perceive anything less than creating a new body with the Nuclear Planning Group moniker — commensurate with the existing NATO entity — to be insufficient.

The divergence between the U.S. and South Korea on extended deterrence mars what had been a near total alignment of policies following Yoon Suk Yeol’s inauguration. U.S. officials and Korea observers in Washington were pleased with the South Korean administrations’ changes since Yoon brought pragmatic thinking to foreign and security issues.

Both sides must manage the nuclear issue with deftness. The U.S. must be proactive in its trust-building efforts to soothe South Korean fears. South Korea must manage expectations about what is possible. President Yoon will feel more pressure to act if North Korea keeps its provocative behavior going.

The nuclear dispute, if not managed well by both parties, could cause tension within the alliance. This is at a time when both countries, as well as other allies in the Indo-Pacific region need to work closely together to address the increasing North Korean threat. Chinese threats. 

World-Class Experience, Expertise in Authorship 

Now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor Bruce Klingner is a senior research fellow specializing in Korean and Japanese affairs at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. From 1996 to 2001, Klingner was CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea, responsible for analyzing political, military, economic, and leadership issues for the president of the United States and other senior U.S. policymakers. In 1993-1994, he was the chief of the CIA’s Korea branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear crisis with North Korea.

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