Lessons of the Ukraine War, and Rethinking America’s Footprint in Europe

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the most significant shakeup of the transatlantic community since fall of the wall. It has changed the world completely, and we need to adapt. 

Vladimir Putin is reducing his traditional military force. Therefore, the U.S. future footprint in Europe shouldn’t be as large as it was in past decades. Nor does it have to be as solid as it was once thought prudent. It is time for us to talk about the future face of America in Europe. 

Lord Palmerston, a cunning, ruthless old mant, stood firm in his defense of his empire, without any compassion, political correctness, or scruples. His dictum is hard to dispute. “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” This type of self-righteous, hard-thinking was lost in post-Cold War times. Instead of making politics end at the water’s edges, U.S. foreign policy has become more like an extension to domestic policy squabbles. 

Jake Sullivan (Joe Biden’s National Security Adviser) has stated that, “We’ve reached a point where foreign policy is domestic policy, and domestic policy is foreign policy.” This is absurd. We need a third approach This structure ensures that America’s actions are aligned with our vital interests. This is especially true in America’s European footprint. 

America’s Global Footprint

America is a Global power with global interests and responsibility. It is simply a fact. It is true, however, that we cannot protect all our interests and responsibilities if we don’t partner with like-minded allies who are equally as risky as they are rewarding. This is supported by the Index of U.S. Military StrengthAn objective assessment of our forces that determines they are not best suited to protect America’s global vital interests. 

America’s security and prosperity is dependent on three key regions: Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. We could make the entire world a ballet scene if we wanted. It is possible to pivot from one region into another With ease. But “pivot” It is an appropriate metaphor as it reminds us that global adversaries could easily knock us off our balance by threatening critical areas in which we are not present. The United States should have the necessary capabilities to defend its vital interests in each theatre. Each region’s geographical footprint should change as the threat increases and other allied contributions do. National security also requires us to be accountable for how we allocate resources. Chip Roy (Rep.) and Victoria Coates (ex-National Security Council staff expert Victoria Coates) are examples of this. NotificationA responsible use of resources will make a military stronger.

The United States requires the right military right away. To learn from the experience of the ongoing war in Ukraine, we need to plan for the future.

America’s Future Footprint 

Along with NATO allies’ material assistance, the U.S. presence has allowed Ukraine to arm Russia in Europe. Putin was also involved in the process. Lost A mammoth The amount the conventional military capabilities. He also witnessed Europeans improve their energy security through a reduction in dependence on Russia.

Many Europeans have redoubled their efforts to increase defense capabilities and share the defense burdens equally. Many NATO countries, including Poland, have now exceeded the 2 percent GDP defense expenditure target. Their percentage of GDP also exceeds the United States. Some of the major European powers, such as Germany, are still behind. However, our most trusted allies are doing more to defend themselves. They are more pro U.S., pro NATO, anti-Russian, and anti China. These governments also show remarkable resilience, despite high inflation, energy worries, and uncertainty regarding the war against Ukraine.

All of these positive outcomes took place without U.S. “boots on the ground.” We did deploy some additional troops as trainers, for logistical support, and on some security assistance and training missions, but these are, by and large, temporary deployments—and, most importantly, there was no requirement for Americans to engage in combat.

This experience—paired with the fact, that 1) Russia’s conventional military threat to Europe has been greatly reduced, 2) it will take Russia years, at best, to rebuild this capability, and 3) Europeans are willing and, in fact, doing more to contribute to collective defense—suggests how the U.S. military footprint should evolve in the future.

Forces

Ground Forces. U.S. combat troops should only be required in a very limited number of theaters. The 173rd Airborne Brigade is primarily used to respond to missions in Eurasia and the Greater Middle East. This makes sense. The United States should have strategically placed rapid-response forces. It’s the same as when you need money while out of town: it is much more convenient to be able withdraw cash at an ATM than to have your bank fly back home.

Washington should have at least two European combat brigade-equivalents for training and exercises with allies. They should also be part of the Forward-deployed Deterrence in Central Europe. They can be rotated forces but their presence and footprint should not be diminished. It is also possible to have a headquarters for a deployed corps that can mobilize a larger contingent force if required. 

Russia might rebuild its conventional forces in the future, but our expectations for Europe’s traditional forces will change. Washington will be able to adjust as necessary in the future, especially if the United States is involved. Total Active, Reserve, National Guard, and Land Force capability retained enough to supply the requirements of theater commanders. 

Air Forces. Trump’s administration Plan to consolidate and rationalize The U.S. footprint was logical. Although the Biden administration cancelled that plan, it is worth a second look. 

Naval Forces. The United States has a vital role in the Mediterranean. This includes helping to build capacity for allies. However, our efforts in this region are not proportionate to America’s needs. This doesn’t mean we need more ships. (We will need more ships, but they are needed in the Indo-Pacific. We will need to Build a larger Navy.) The United States can achieve a lot more in Europe by encouraging security cooperation and a diplomatic strategy that leverages burden-sharing, joint action and other benefits.

Presence

It’s not about how many U.S. troops are present in strategic locations, but rather the presence and access of the United States, as well as the ability to contract or expand as needed. Greenland, Iceland and Canada are crucial to the protection of the transatlantic bridge. Great Britain and Germany are vital logistical, training and support nodes. Poland is crucial for forward presence. Many countries—Italy, Romania, Greece, Turkey, and, potentially, Georgia—offer essential basing and access options in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

Small U.S. contingents such as KFOR can also make a positive contribution to stability in the region.

Enablers

Russia’s war in Ukraine has taught us that countries that show a willingness and ability to defend themselves are more likely than others to support them in crisis. Many European nations are searching for ways to improve their ability to defend their citizens. These enablers include intelligence sharing, surveillance and targeting, as well as training and technical cooperation. 

A growing number of people will need to be able to do this. extended nuclear deterrence. The Ukraine war is a reminder of how difficult it can be to fight with any nuclear-armed enemy directly, especially if there is a possibility of escalation. Russia’s dependence upon nuclear deterrence will rise as its conventional forces decrease. China’s rapid expansion in its strategic forces is another concern. It is essential that the U.S. missile defenses and nuclear umbrella are strong and capable. 

Partnerships 

America’s ongoing presence and engagement in Europe has enabled Europeans to be more pro-American, anti-Russian, and anti-China. It also empowered governments that share the concerns of many conservative Americans on domestic matters like family, religion liberty, life, education, and energy policies. This is strengthening transatlantic connections. To make the U.S. presence in Europe smaller and more sustainable, it would be a mistake to cut off these relationships, cooperation, or burden-sharing. It is important to strengthen partnerships. 

NATO is still a foundation for collective security. NATO’s enlargement brings in new partners who can share the burden. Sweden and Finland are two great examples. 

The United States can also strengthen bilateral relations with countries which can provide real benefits through burden sharing or partnership. These countries include Italy, Greece, Romania and Poland, to name a few. Italy is an example. The natural U.S. partner to lead the Greater Mediterranean region. 

Additionally, the United States should provide support collective efforts to expand security and economic cooperation in Northern, Central, and Southern Europe and across the Black Sea into the Caucuses and Central Asia. 

Finally, the United States should continue to push reluctant allies, like Germany, to adapt our joint efforts to the realities of the new Europe. 

This rethinking has implications for other regions as well. For instance, if America can work with the Arab nations and Israel in building out the Abraham Accords, the United States can have a similar collective security footprint in the Middle East.

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