Turkey’s shift towards Russia during the Ukraine conflict may now be reversing towards the West.

Surprising⁤ Developments in Turkey’s Relationship with NATO and Russia

On a U.S. military flight ⁢earlier this month, a delegation of six senators was winging its ‌way⁣ to Vilnius,‍ Lithuania, to attend the crucial NATO leaders’ summit.

The bipartisan group ⁤included Democratic ‌Sens.‌ Dick Durbin (IL), Jeanne Shaheen (NH), and independent Angus King (ME), who caucuses with Democrats.‌ Along with⁢ Republican Sens. Pete Ricketts (NE), Dan Sullivan (AK), and Thom‍ Tillis (NC).

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Inevitably,⁣ the conversation turned to⁤ the ​spoiler role Turkey was playing in blocking Sweden’s bid to join NATO. ⁢Having​ Sweden as a member⁣ would be a big boost for the alliance and an embarrassing setback for Russian President Vladimir‌ Putin’s stated goal ‌of limiting NATO’s eastward expansion.

It was a “major discussion on the airplane,” King told CNN⁢ after the summit. “What ​is Turkey going to do?”

Much to their surprise, when the senators​ landed in‌ the Lithuanian⁤ capital, they ⁤discovered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had announced he would drop his opposition to Sweden’s accession ‌to NATO in return⁤ for Western help to ‌Turkey’s moribund application ⁢to join the European Union.

It was, King said, “a very important step and one ⁢that very few of us predicted.”

In recent years, longtime NATO ally Turkey, under Erdogan, has been​ tilting toward Moscow — most‍ notably by purchasing, over ‍strident U.S. objections, Russian S-400 air ⁣defense systems incompatible with NATO systems.

In 2019, ⁣under the Trump administration, the United States booted Turkey as ​a partner ​in America’s F-35 stealth ⁣fighter jet program for refusing to give up‍ the⁢ Russian anti-aircraft systems, ​which, if operated near F-35s, ‍could compromise the fifth-generation‍ fighter jet’s stealth properties.

There‍ was even talk⁤ about ⁣whether Turkey, a NATO member for ​more than 60 ​years, should remain in the alliance, given its increasingly cozy ‌relationship with Putin’s Russia.

But buoyed by a narrow reelection victory last ​month, ⁣which solidified his⁤ already sweeping presidential powers, and seeing Russia’s military fortunes declining on the battlefields of Ukraine, Erdogan made a⁢ series of moves he had to know would not please Putin.

Early this month, he warmly welcomed Ukrainian President ⁣Volodymyr ⁤Zelensky‌ to Turkey.⁢ And,⁣ in a surprise move, he turned over five Ukrainian commanders captured ‍by Russia during the siege ⁢of Mariupol last year.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov angrily accused Turkey of⁢ violating an agreement to hold on to⁤ the prisoners until the end of hostilities.

Instead,‍ the five⁢ Azovstal defenders, as they ​were known, ​received a hero’s welcome when they ​returned‌ to Kyiv.

While hosting ⁤Zelensky in Istanbul, Erdogan also voiced‌ full support for Ukraine ​joining NATO as soon ⁣as the war‌ with Russia comes to an​ end.

“There‍ is no doubt that Ukraine deserves NATO membership,” he said at a news conference with Zelensky.

Then, in‌ the run-up to the NATO ⁣summit in‍ Vilnius, thanks in part to President⁤ Joe Biden’s promise to sell F-16s to Turkey,⁣ NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg was⁣ able ⁢to​ broker an agreement whereby Erdogan would ⁤lift his⁣ objections to ‍Sweden becoming the 32nd NATO nation in⁢ return⁣ for ‍Western help reviving Turkey’s bid to join‍ the EU.

In an opinion essay in the ‌Kyiv Independent, freelance journalist ⁣David Kirichenko gushed about the recent ​turn of events sending​ a message⁢ that Erdogan now sees Russia‌ as “the sick ‍man ⁢of Europe.”

“Turkey has made it clear that it prioritizes its status as a NATO country ‍above⁤ all else, with its⁣ commitment to⁢ the alliance taking precedence over its relations with Russia,”‍ he wrote.

Not so fast,‌ countered Sinan Ciddi, a senior fellow at the ​Foundation ⁤for Defense of Democracies, who argued ⁢Erdogan is “just leveraging a situation to his advantage.”

“I don’t think it’s ⁢necessarily about reanchoring‌ back to the⁣ West. It’s about leveraging policy ⁣goals that he has,” Ciddi told the Washington Examiner. “His major goal right ​now is basically obtaining F-16 fighter jets and a requisite number of upgrade kits⁢ for Turkey’s‌ existing fleet⁤ because the Turkish Air Force is getting ⁣old.”

The initial euphoria at NATO ⁤when⁢ Erdogan agreed to ‌forward the accession ‌protocol for Sweden to ⁤Turkey’s Grand National Assembly was tempered when Erdogan said the next day‌ that it would wait until the‌ parliament met in October.

“He⁣ could call ⁢the ⁤Turkish parliament back into session tomorrow if⁤ he wanted,”​ Ciddi said. ⁤“But I ⁤think he’s not sure ‍if Congress is going to deliver and lift​ its⁣ waiver of selling Turkey F-16‌ jets.”

Erdogan may have good reason to hedge his bets, ⁣given⁤ that Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-NJ) has said he wants Turkey to back off‍ aggressive​ acts against its neighbors‍ —⁣ in particular,‍ Greece — before ‌he lifts his hold on the F-16 sale.

Ciddi argued Erdogan shouldn’t be given ⁤too much ‍credit for relenting ​on Sweden, ‍which he said is “just‌ basically doing the right thing.”

If⁢ Turkey were really‌ realigning with ⁢the West, Ciddi⁣ argued, it would be doing a lot more, including backing tougher sanctions against Russia, divesting itself of Russian S-400 air defense⁣ systems,⁢ and joining ⁤the U.S.‌ in the​ fight against the Islamic⁢ State in Syria.

But Erdogan wants to ⁢maintain‌ his relations with⁢ Russia,‍ which is a ​major trading partner with Turkey, a⁤ source of⁣ tourism, and a provider of natural gas.

“Erdogan is basically throwing an olive branch toward the ‍West mainly because he ‌can and simply because Putin is​ not necessarily in a position to do anything against him because he is in a bit ‌of a weakened position,” Ciddi said.

“Erdogan will continue to use this position ⁤to leverage policy​ goals out of‍ Washington … and he will also leverage his relationship with Russia,” he‌ said. “It’s not ‍either/or. It’s basically leveraging both to the extent that he can for his own material​ gains.”

Or, as King put it, “Erdogan is⁣ a transactional kind of ‌guy.”