David Weiss’s office disregarded well-examined evidence of Biden corruption.

The Delaware U.S. attorney’s office received a detailed briefing that established the FD-1023 implicating Hunter ⁣and Joe Biden in a Ukrainian bribery scandal⁣ was⁣ not Russian disinformation⁣ and was not sourced to Rudy Giuliani, according to a‌ transcribed interview of former Pittsburgh U.S. ​Attorney Scott Brady. Yet the Delaware U.S. attorney’s office seemingly‌ ignored the work undertaken by the Pittsburgh office and acted ‍with willful blindness⁢ to the evidence implicating⁤ the now-president and his son.

Last Monday, Brady sat for a transcribed interview ‍before the‍ House Judiciary Committee.⁤ Over ⁢the ​course of some six⁤ hours of questioning, the committee elicited testimony ​revealing the Pittsburgh office’s diligence in tackling the task ​given by former Attorney General Willam Barr:⁢ to screen evidence​ presented to the Department of Justice related to Ukraine.

The public has known‍ for​ some time, ⁢thanks to Sen. Chuck Grassley,⁤ R-Iowa, and IRS whistleblowers, ⁢that the Pittsburgh-based U.S. attorney’s office had provided the Delaware ‍office‍ information about an FD-1023 that‌ summarized a “highly credible” confidential human source’s reporting that Hunter and Joe Biden pressured Ukrainian energy company Burisma to pay them each $5 million in bribes.

More recently, ⁤IRS⁣ whistleblower Gary Shapley revealed ⁤that Delaware ‍Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Lesley Wolf had refused‌ to ⁢accept a briefing from the Pittsburgh office until ordered to do so​ by Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General (PADAG) Rich Donoghue. According to Shapley, Wolf ​wanted nothing to​ do with the Pittsburgh-based ⁢U.S. attorney’s office because⁣ she believed‍ that no information from that⁢ office could be credible, having, in her mind, ⁣originated from Giuliani.

However, the FD-1023 was unconnected to​ Giuliani. And Brady’s⁤ testimony, a transcript of which The Federalist has ‌reviewed,‌ confirms the briefing to⁢ Wolf made that point clear. Brady testified that in briefing Wolf, his lead‍ AUSAs told ‍her ⁢the FD-1023 “was from a credible CHS that had a history with the FBI, and that it was not‌ derived⁤ from any of the information from Mr. Giuliani.” Further, in the briefing, the Pittsburgh AUSAs informed the Delaware U.S. attorney’s ​office they believed the FD-1023 had indicia of credibility that merited further investigation.

Brady’s⁢ testimony also revealed many other facets ⁢of ⁣the ‌briefing. ⁤For instance, Brady explained it was “a substantive briefing” ⁢of the information his team had screened and had concluded was credible ​— or had some indicia ⁤of credibility — and which they⁢ “thought would be of⁣ interest to⁤ them or that they ​should ‍investigate further…” Brady‌ reiterated that in the briefing, ⁢the Pittsburgh AUSAs shared information they had vetted that they believed “required further analysis, further investigation, including using the tools of⁢ a grand jury,” and​ that​ included⁣ the⁤ FD-1023.

While the focus of many of the questions ⁣concerned ⁢the FD-1023, Brady confirmed the October briefing ‍to ​the Delaware U.S. attorney’s office included ‌other materials⁢ too.‌ Brady did⁣ not elaborate on what other​ evidence his‍ team ⁢gave U.S. Attorney⁢ David Weiss’s ⁢team. Though from Brady’s testimony, it appears ​his office also screened evidence ​that suggested the potential involvement of the Ukrainian PrivatBank, so that seems like one possibility.

The ‍Judiciary Committee ⁢also elicited testimony ⁤from Brady that during the briefing, the‍ Pittsburgh U.S. attorney’s office detailed the investigative​ steps they had taken. “What we‍ were doing was, as a part of the briefing,‍ giving ‌them the investigative steps that we ​had‍ taken within our limited ability to corroborate the information provided by the CHS,” Brady explained.

While ⁣Brady’s attorney would only allow him to speak at​ a high level about the investigative steps,​ even ‍from an elevated perch the ​summary‍ makes clear the briefing should have impelled the Delaware U.S. attorney’s office to action.

Among other things,‍ in ‌screening the evidence, Brady’s ⁣team looked to corroborate information in the FD-1023 — ‍for instance, relating to travel and the purchase of a North American oil and gas company by ‍Burisma. In⁤ explaining their screening process, Brady noted they could look at public financial‌ filings and‍ media reports, including foreign reporting they‌ had translated.

Brady also confirmed that ⁢the Pittsburgh FBI office obtained travel records of the CHS and that they “interfaced with the⁤ CHS’s handler about certain statements relating to travel and meetings to‌ see if​ they were consistent with ⁤his​ or her understanding.” What they were⁤ able to identify, Brady testified, was consistent with the CHS’s representations in⁣ the ‍FD-1023.

The Pittsburgh-based team of prosecutors also identified many potential witnesses ⁣related to Ukrainian corruption, Brady testified, with some in Ukraine and others in the United States. Brady explained his investigators interviewed some state-side witnesses, confirming that the screening​ process went much beyond interviewing Giuliani.

Significantly, ⁣Brady explained that in screening the⁢ evidence, ⁢his office‌ vetted the FD-1023⁢ and the CHS ⁤“against known sources ⁤of Russian ⁣disinformation.” To conduct that analysis, his team worked with ‍the Eastern District of New York. “It was‍ found that it was not⁣ sourced from ⁤Russian disinformation,” Brady told the House Judiciary ⁢Committee.

Also important was Brady’s reference to being tasked ​by Barr to coordinate with the “intelligence services,” which resulted in the ⁣Pittsburgh‌ U.S. attorney’s office “interfacing” with intelligence agencies to⁤ vet the evidence that was eventually relayed to Delaware.

As‍ Brady ⁤put it, ⁤we “developed work streams through discussions with other, either components​ within DOJ or‌ other federal agencies to run certain things to ground.”

Not only did ‍the Pittsburgh U.S. attorney’s office give the Delaware office a ​summary ‌of the information screened,‍ investigative steps ⁣taken, and corroborating evidence, but Brady’s team identified investigative leads for Weiss’s office. Brady’s lead⁤ AUSAs also made “recommendations​ about possible investigative avenues that we ⁢would recommend that⁤ they take,” ⁢Brady ⁤said. ‍When pushed by the House Judiciary Committee on ‍this point, Brady confirmed that as part of the briefing, his office‌ recommended certain actions, but that he could not elaborate⁣ on what those recommendations were.

The totality of Brady’s recommendations, however, were included in a detailed ​final report he submitted to Donoghue in September 2020. In that report, Brady⁢ also recommended his team provide a briefing to the ⁢U.S. attorney’s office⁣ in Delaware. Significantly, after submitting​ the report, Donoghue and Brady spoke,​ and Donoghue concurred with ⁣Brady’s recommendation to brief Weiss’s team — confirming that the evidence merited consideration by the U.S. attorney’s ‍office investigating Hunter ⁣Biden.

Yet it appears ⁢the detailed briefing changed nothing, ⁢as Wolf​ pushed forward with the sweetheart plea for Hunter ‌Biden, which has since been abandoned. Before the briefing from Pittsburgh, Wolf may have been able ‌to hide ​behind ‍the belief ⁢that​ the evidence flowing from there was the ⁢incredible rantings of Giuliani. But Brady’s testimony last ​week makes⁢ clear ​the Delaware team knew the FD-1023 was not Russian disinformation, was not from Giuliani, came⁣ from a highly reliable CHS, and merited further ​investigation.

Brady exposed that the Delaware office was — at best — willfully blind to ​the Biden-family corruption‌ evidence ‌the Pittsburgh office gave ⁣Weiss’s team. Yet Attorney General ​Merrick Garland expects Americans to believe that Weiss, now as a special counsel, will objectively see the⁤ evidence he and his ‌team were⁣ blind to before.