Is China Trying to Rule Asia or the Whole World?

Conservative News DailyJanuary 5, 2023

China is a country that believes in democracy poses Serious challengeIf not, dangerous threatTo the U.S., this belief is one of few that has been agreed upon in Washington. Today the best way to build bipartisan support for legislation on Capitol Hill is to claim that it bolsters America’s defenses against Beijing.

[embedded content]

Subscribe to Our YouTube Channel Here.)

What makes the People’s Republic of China unique is its size. China would be more like other countries, and not a problem. Liberal-minded people and governments worldwide never had to consider what to do about, say, Franco’s Spain, the horrid Eritrean dystopia, or assorted Central Asian tyrannies. These regimes caused serious problems for their citizens but not much more.

Contrary to this, the 20Th Century’s two most aggressive totalitarian death states, Adolf Hitler’s Germany and Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union, presented very different challenges. Unusual international danger was created when ambition and ability merged. Despite the immense evil they committed, their modest economies and small populations ultimately limited them.

The 1949 birth of the first PRC meant that it was rare for a country to be so prolific in its killings, but that it had limited its actions beyond its borders. Even the island of Taiwan, but 100 miles offshore, was beyond Beijing’s reach. But what of today’s Chinese incarnation?

Modern-Day Force

It no longer is Mao Zedong’s impoverished, low-tech murderous despotism. Rather, the PRC not only possesses the world’s largest (though soon to be second-largest) population. China is also high-tech and middle-income. How far do China’s ambitions go? Although more restrained than its Maoist incarnation, the CCP’s aspirations matter. These desires, if outsized, will require Washington and other democratic countries to respond more strongly.

Even a resolute Beijing faces some challenges. One aspect is what has been called “The Beijing ConsensusContrary to the famed Washington consensus. China offers what appears to be a success model for development, a statist-constrained capitalism that does not pretend to protect liberty and civil and political freedom. This view has been a boon for aspiring authoritarians around the world.

China Expands Beyond its Borders

The PRC also enabled these regimes through trade with, investments in, or aid to authoritarian system. Burma/Myanmar (Sudan), and Zimbabwe were just a few of the dictatorships that benefited from Chinese economic assistance. In all three cases, Beijing’s presence undercut Western pressure. For instance, when Sudan was under U.S. sanctions, China was involved in the former’s energy development. I visited Khartoum at the time and saw Chinese businessmen staying in my hotel. Also, there was Chinese food on the buffet.

Although the Beijing Consensus may be against liberal values and lessens incentives for authoritarian governments to reform, it does not appear to be aggressive. Beijing appears not to be seeking to win over Westerners, even though the PRC is known for its alternative actions. China is more of an enabler rather than an evangelist. This is most evident when the West uses punitive pressure on another government to make them change. This is a moral offense, but it is not a problem for liberal democracies and the U.S. in particular. the world’s most avid proponent Economic sanctions can drive countries towards the PRC.

China’s Future Directions

It is also important to consider whether Beijing has greater ideological goals. Today’s CCP is not your father’s or grandfather’s communist party. It is Leninist and ruthlessly so under Xi. But it is not Marxist in its practice. The party contains There are far too many Chinese businessmen. who believe They are vital.

Indeed, Mao Yushi, a relative of the founder, was a target for many years by followers. “Red Emperor”Founder of Unirule Institute of Economics (formerly known as ), for criticizing his namesake. Xi is increasingly resembling Mao in his rule (Zedong, and not Yushi), but this does not mean a revival or ideological communism. Xi has retreated from the markets. for political reasons—not so much to build a Marxist economic system as to quiet criticism of economic inequalityLimit the influence of entrepreneurs and strengthen party control over everything that is China. This clearly undermines the liberals in China’s People’s Republic of China (which are largely hidden in the closet) who have less voice than those from outside China.

Even more troubling is the assertion that Beijing seeks global dominance, more for ideological than nationalist reasons. Discerning what is in the minds of Zhongnanhai’s residents is not easy. Mao’s leadership, the PRC could not impose its will upon the world. Deng is well-known for articulating the strategy that China would wait its turn. Xi has abandoned any sense of national restraint—which has had negative practical consequences—but so far has limited his aggressiveness to his Asian neighborhood.

There is little to suggest that Xi’s PRC wants to make the world communist, though he has mouthed the usual platitudes about socialism’s ultimate triumph. After all, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” really is not socialism, but a much more extreme version of economic interventionism as practiced by most of the world’s industrial states. It is unclear to what extent he expects China to replace the U.S., and refashion the concept of the “The Other.” “rules-based international order.” (The Western order can be better described as this, since Washington violates the rules Beijing has made it clear that it will do so whenever it pleases. Much has been written In an attempt to assess the PRC’s intentions as well as capabilities. Some predictions were almost apocalyptic. with warnings inevitable conflict and confrontation.

Trump-Era and Later Assessment

Trump’s administration has made the fundamental claim in a detailed State Department paper: “The CCP aims not merely at preeminence within the established world order—an order that is grounded in free and sovereign nation-states, flows from the universal principles on which America was founded, and advances U.S. national interests—but to fundamentally revise world order, placing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the center and serving Beijing’s authoritarian goals and hegemonic ambitions.”

Michael Pillsbury, who is best known for his work in the U.S. Department of Defense was earlier a similar, more detailed argument. Rush Doshi, an alumnus of Brookings Institute, was last year with the Biden Nat Security Council. argued that The PRC has used multiple methods “strategies of displacement” The U.S. and its order, established by it, are the established hegemons.

Other respected Sinologists disagree, not so much over China’s desire to rise but the nature and breadth Control desired. For example, Oriana Sylar Mastro of Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies pointed to limitations in Doshi’s argument. She argued: “Chinese discourage, capabilities, and behavior all demonstrate that the PRC’s focus remains on regional contingencies, even those involving the United States. If China’s military ambitions are global, they are not defined by plans to fight wars against the United States in the Middle East, Africa, or South America (the United States would easily win those wars).”

Nevertheless, Beijing’s aspirations, though not an existential threat to the U.S., still appear to be large, however exactly formulated. For instance, explained Mastro:

“Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of a global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential. In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed. As one Chinese official put it to me, ‘Being a great power means you get to do what you want, and no one can say anything about it.’ In other words, China is trying to displace, rather than replace, the United States.”

The issue is not so much America’s position as dominant power—which is the central problem as seen from Washington—as Beijing’s presumed desire to become the new dominant power with the ability to make detrimental changes in the status quo. For smaller states and those in the vicinity, a transformed world order where the PRC has effectively rewrote the rules can be more uncomfortable. The important thing is to reduce American control and increase the absence of Chinese influence. In practice, this probably means maintaining significant U.S. or European international influence. While perpetual preservation of Washington’s unusual position, gained in the unusual circumstances after World War II, is unlikely. Even those countries that are more friendly to Beijing will not allow Beijing to monopolize international power.

China’s Ambition to Dominate

However, it is important not to overestimate China’s ability to dominate the international order. Aspiration is different from intention, which in turn can differ from capacity. That Beijing would like to become the globe’s praecipua potentiaThe principal power is not exceptional. The U.S. wanted to be able to overtake Great Britain. This was despite the fact that Great Britain worked hard to prevent Wilhelmine Germany from occupying this position. The PRC, however, isn’t yet capable of surpassing Washington.

Beijing’s weaknesses and limitations are manifest. These will hinder the country’s efforts to create a powerful military and an influential foreign strategy. Argued the Brookings’ Institution’s Ryan Hass: “it is hardly a foregone conclusion that China will travel a linear path toward realizing its goals. For an accurate measure of the challenges China poses to U.S. interests, Beijing’s strengths must be evaluated alongside its vulnerabilities. Xi and his advisers face as stiff a set of challenges as almost anyone else in the world.”

While the PRC has been expanding its military, the U.S. is still a major player globally. Beijing’s advantage is threefold: it focuses on the Asia-Pacific, is surrounded by nations That’s how it should be for a long time have underinvested The military, though that is changing It is also thousands of miles away the U.S. China is not a dominant country in any way, not even regionally. It has 14 land borders and 6 sea lines, and is surrounded with nations it has been at war against over the last century (Indiana, Japan Korea and Russia).

It is just as dangerous to inflate the China threat as it is to dismiss it. Argued the Quincy Institute’s Michael Swaine: “Framing the military challenge Beijing poses in categorical and exceedingly alarmist, worst-case ways removes the need to determine the limits of Chinese threats. China becomes 10 feet tall, undeterred from wanting to destroy the United States except by a massive U.S. counterforce. Such threat inflation also undermines those voices within China that favor moderation, significantly raises the danger of Sino–American crises and military conflict, and diverts huge amounts of U.S. resources away from desperately needed nonmilitary uses at home and abroad.”

China Analysts

However, few analysts believe conflict is truly inevitable. This is why they write books encouraging America (and other countries) to adopt a tougher approach to the PRC. They hope this will prevent a Sino-dominated world. Beijing’s decisions will determine whether China seeks to dominate and impose its will coercively. Pillsbury wrote: “A China-led world in 2049 will be worse if the [Chinese] hawks decide China’s policies. If the moderates and real reformers take over, with Western help, then a dominant China would not be as menacing.”

Policy by the PRC’s rivals also will help determine the direction of Chinese policy. This does not require endless appeasement but constant discernment. Beijing might perceive some policies as potentially hostile and may respond accordingly. Others may not be as successful. Swaine and Ashley J. TellisAt the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he warned: “First, so long as there is some chance that the predicted outcome of assertiveness may not occur, U.S. strategy ought to neither create the preconditions for its occurrence nor retreat in the expectation that its occurrence is inevitable. Second, if there exists some hope that the worst ravages of future security competition between the United States and China can be avoided, U.S. grand strategists are bound both by the dictates of prudence and by moral sensibility to explore every possibility that reduces the prospects of international turmoil.”

The final result is that it is unlikely to know the precise contours of Chinese leaders’ ambitions at any given moment. They are likely to change over time with new leaders. Liberal-oriented countries should assume that Beijing will seek power and influence to shape the international system in its favor. This is prudent.

Uncertain to what extent. But policymakers must be ready for the worst. They should also consider the possibility of Chinese policy being more benign than expected. Given the uncertainty surrounding the future, the prospect that China will become a stronger country should be seen as a potential threat and multi-faceted challenge, but not as a reason to abandon their moral principles or freedom policies. This makes democracy just as effective as it is right.

More: Can a Coup Takedown Putin for Good?

More: Is Donald Trump Going Crazy?

More: Could Mike Pence Beat Donald Trump in 2024?

More: NATO vs. Russia – What World War III Would Look Like

Doug Bandow He is a Senior Fellow of the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire.