Does the U.S. Need a New Strategic Paradigm?

Military theory is a critical and oft-neglected piece of any state’s national security strategy, and the United States is no exception. It is abstract and conceptual, which makes it difficult to combine the safety and comfort of quantitative information with empirical methods that are so effective with increasing technology and computational power. However, the absence of a theoretical framework for any state’s strategic process is always evident in hindsight of a security problem gone poorly. From Bernard Brodie’s iconic lamentation: “Soldiers usually are close students of tactics, but rarely are they students of strategy and practically never of war;” to Colin Gray’s amusement at the persisting “buzzword” culture of the U.S. security sector, the world’s greatest strategic scholars have consistently observed that there is something missing from U.S. security policy and scholarship which manifests in a consistent failure to develop effective strategy.[i]

Epistemology, a crucial analytical tool that can be used to create a cohesive strategy, is often overlooked. “the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope. Epistemology is the investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from fiction.”[ii] Without a common theoretical system, a strategy’s validity conflates with its popularity, promoting a climate of catchy phrases and trendy ideas. There is no framework to assess the merits or drawbacks a given course of action, until it has failed in execution.

This research inductively identifies current U.S. strategic framework and assesses its effectiveness. Then, it proposes a more efficient paradigm for future use. This paper concludes that the U.S. has a flawed understanding about Revolutions in Military Affairs theory. It suggests that technological development efforts should be guided by environmental trends, rather than trying predict the next generation of defense platforms. The paper begins with a history of RMA theory, followed by two case studies that show how it has influenced U.S. strategy history. The paper then introduces a trend-based paradigm that would better make use of its resources.

One quick note about relevance: RMA Theory was a sad victim of buzzword fatigue in greater U.S. Military-Industrial community. Its original meaning, which was strict and precise, had lost its significance by the time it became popular in 2000. This was due to its incorrect and frequent use. Although the community has moved on, there is no evidence that RMA is still being discussed. However, it does not indicate its utility or relevance as a theoretical framework for the creation of an effective strategy, as this article attempts to show.

History and Theory of RMA

What some scholars call “Strategic paradigm” is the closest thing to what the United States uses. “techno-fetishism,” A unique interpretation of the well-known theory Revolutions in Military Affairs.[iii] RMA theory appeared for the first time in commentary literature towards the end the Cold War. Soviet strategists who observed U.S. military advancement in the early 1980s created the United States. The United States developed weaponry that could outmatch any conventional assets and negate the Soviet military’s numerical advantage. Two examples are the M1 Abrams tank, and the AH-64 Apache helicopter.[iv] Russian observers saw these outputs, and concluded that the Americans were right in the middle. “Military Technical Revolution.” The American Strategic Scholars discovered the findings and adopted them into their own literature. In the middle of the 1980s, the U.S. Department of Defense would recognize the phenomenon as a Revolution in Military Affairs. They have continued to use the framework as the basis for their strategic process.[v]

RMA, which is based on the chaos theory of physical sciences, aims to explain historical discontinuities in the practice and execution of war. The basic argument behind RMA is that there’s an integral link between military advance and decisive victory.[vi] Williamson Murray, a historian, found that RMAs are a constant phenomenon in war. However, technological and weaponry advancements are tied to larger changes in society, warfare, but not necessarily causes them. More importantly, Murray’s survey found that these perceived disruptions were linear and cumulative; that is, war and warfare evolve in response to changing operational variables. He cited the example of the phenomenon he called “The Development of…” Blitzkrieg during the interwar period, which was the result of the German military’s analysis of strategic history. The Germans found a way to avoid the destruction of artillery and trench warfare in World War I (the final military revolution), and created the technological tools for their military to do so.[vii]

Murray’s insights notwithstanding, the U.S. military-industrial complex generally assumes a causal link between technical innovation and RMA. The United States heavily relies on superior technology, not just as part of its military strategy but also as the strategy itself. Superior technology is both the means and the end of strategy, according to the Lykke Model.[viii] This unique strategy is evident in the two U.S. victories that were decisive. The atomic bomb was the first to be used. Its pure destructive power broke the Japanese will not fight and ended World War II. Recent innovations allowed the United States to win the Gulf War with a sound victory over Iraq.

Operation Desert Storm, often cited as the ultimate proof of a causal connection between technology and RMAs (reporting the use of emergent abilities for dominant battlespace know (DBK) through information-led war, precision guided munitions, and dominant maneuver, transformed the fundamental characteristics and nature of modern warfare.[ix] While these innovations were huge assets that supported a decisive victory of the coalition, others argue that they ignore other important changes which clearly contributed towards the accepted revolution.

Marshall Beier points out an increasing number of “techno-fetishism” a larger American society that is fixated on technological innovations to the exclusion all other aspects war and strategy.[x] Colin Gray also observed that when technology is accepted as a causal link in warfare, but without understanding the historical context of RMA theory and its history, then any new observation made in the field strategic studies is likely receive a revolutionary title all its own. This creates a strategic climate based on unvalidated buzzwords.[xi] The large military-industrial complex, which has been essential to U.S. defence, likely drove the shift from RMA to techno-fetishism. Over time, the products of this complex came to be synonymous with strategy and replaced the RMA framework. Although RMA theory as derived in the U.S. has helped to create viable strategies in the past it ignores the other historical conditions that were part of the formula for victory. Superior technology was not enough then and it will not again.

Case Studies

This article examines four case studies: The Joint Strike Fighter Program, Defense Innovative Initiative (DII), and the Joint Strike Fighter Program. BlitzkriegGerasimov Doctrine and. These case studies show the weaknesses in the U.S. RMA framework. They also demonstrate how a technology-driven approach limits strategic options. These two case studies provide evidence of the explicatory power conditional variables as strategic assets. That is, strategic demand drives technological revolutions that generate new strategic options.

Technology-Driven RMA Paradigm: U.S. Case Studies

The weaknesses of the U.S. strategy are evident in the Joint Strike Fighter Program, and the Defense Innovative Initiative (DII). The Joint Strike Fighter Program responsible for the development and manufacture of F-35 is a multilateral collaboration and an integral part of U.S. strategic strategy. Since 2001, the F-35 has been under development. In total, 850 F-35 platforms have been deployed by various militaries.[xii] The aircraft was built to be a futuristic long-range stealth fighter capable of dominating airspace over land and ocean.[xiii] Since the start of the program, the JSF has been unable to meet its original goal of replacing the majority of the U.S. military’s fighter fleet with a cost-effective combat platform generations ahead of what adversaries might field. The U.S. Government Accountability Office states that the program has failed to meet its deadlines, exceeded budget by more than 70%, required three major program restructurings, fails to attain adequate mission capability, and is the most expensive weapons program in the DoD. The project will continue to drain resources and is expected to become an unsustainable resource drain in the future.[xiv]

Even if JSF proceeded as planned, it wouldn’t have made a strategic impact. The F35 was intended to be the best fighter platform. However, this assumes that there is a global strategic need for this specific weapon system. Because the F35 can only be used within an active battlefield, it is not a tactical or operational asset. While strike fighters are essential for airspace security, they still aren’t sufficient. That is, an enemy could devise a plan that would bypass the F35 (e.g. hypersonic weapons that can defy intercept). To put it another way, are the JSF resources worth what they consume compared to the strategic asset outputs it produces? You should also consider the fact that the U.S. Air Force announced the prototyping of its replacement, the Next Generation Air Dominance system. (NGAD).[xv] The JSF has already shown a decline in utility, as has every other military innovation. This shows that technological superiority, especially for tactical innovations is not a reliable means to achieve strategic goals and is unpredictable.

It is worth noting that this analysis comes close to arguing in favor of Colin Gray’s third fallacy of air power: that the development of airpower is driven by technology and not ideas. This research concurs with Gray’s findings that development has been driven by ideas, theory, and doctrine. [xvi] This analysis is unique because it does not focus on a strategic need that is tied to future trends and geopolitical variables, but instead has focused exclusively on developing doctrine to improve existing doctrine. This allows it to be accounted for and anticipated by other strategies rather than increasing U.S. benefits.

The DII mirrors the limitations of the JSF’s strategic utility in line with RMA theory. It focuses on apex weapons in general, with a particular focus on DBKs and PGMs to regain parity with China or Russia. More commonly referred to as the United States’ Third Offset Strategy (3OS), it is a crafted response to a perceived military-technical trend (possibly a new RMA) generally labelled anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) operations which aims to harden land, sea, air, and space terminal vulnerabilities while generating longer-range offensive assets.[xvii] This is the place to look for the next evolution in military technology. It’s the continuation of the pursuit of better weaponry than any other country. 3OS is based on two unvalidated assumptions. The first is that it assumes that an enemy of the U.S. won’t develop a superior piece technology that will stop U.S. advancement efforts. It only deals with military capability. It doesn’t allow for more U.S. power to integrate, particularly when it comes to military actions below the threshold. This is an important aspect of the current Chinese strategy.[xviii] The tendency of U.S. enemies to avoid direct engagement with the U.S. when they pursue strategic objectives raises questions about whether it is worth the investment due to the impossibility of new 3OS platforms generating more immediate options.

Situational Variables-Driven Paradigm. Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Gerasimov Doctrine

Blitzkrieg is an acronym for U.S. strategic culture. It was used by U.S. journalists and British journalists to describe the dramatic shift in German strategy, tactics, and tactics that led to World War II.[xix] While the badge of ‘lightning warfare” is retrospectively applied to this case study as the first viable employment of mechanized military forces, this puts a lot more emphasis on the technical aspects than there was at the time of its dominance. After the high cost of trench warfare from World War I, German strategist turned back to history to identify ways to neutralize an entrenched enemy’These are its advantages.[xx] The principle of decisive maneuver, which was a keystay of Moltke the Elder’s fame, was reintroduced.[xxi] This principle, combined with the development of combined arms tactics that emerged at World War I, created the archetype for modern warfare we study today.[xxii] Ultimately, “lightning warfare” was the culminating strategy from an intense analyses of tactical options, a study of the enemy strategy, and the incorporation of new technologies in order to enhance the strategy’s effectiveness exponentially.

Journalists in the West have made Gerasimov Doctrine a popular buzzword, just like Blitzkrieg. In its brief time, it was generally understood as Russia’s framework for future war, a hybridized approach between asymmetric and conventional military means to achieve political objectives. The origin of this phrase traces to a 2013 article written by then-Chief of the General Staff of the Army—General Valeiry Gerasimov. The article called for military scientists to recommit themselves to projecting future warfare and to demand innovations that go beyond the current path of progress.[xxiii] The article was a lens through which the West viewed the Russian strategy for the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.[xxiv]

This phrase was short-lived as it was inaccurate and ineffective in anticipating and accounting future Russian actions.[xxv] As with the other buzzwords, it was unable to grasp and identify its subject ontologically. It is still worth reading the Gerasimov article as well as related Russian activity. Gerasimov saw the need for Russia’s hybrid warfare to be based on global strategic trends. Gerasimov’s title says it all. “The Value of Science is in Foresight,” Gerasimov was not advocating a permanent military doctrine, but strategic minds to come up with new options for Russia.[xxvi] Gerasimov called on an intellectual RMA to combine available technologies in order to reach political goals efficiently.

Framing Future Strategy

The U.S. strategic paradigm uses a technology-first approach to develop advanced assets without first considering their needs. This begs the question about future war planning. It is clear that there is too much focus on battlefields and operational campaigns and less on global context and strategic threat assessment.[xxvii] The drive for technological supremacy to achieve tactical overmatch conflates as both a way and means, institutionalizing what Colin Gray observed as the American military-industrial complex’s monomaniacal hunger for the “next big thing.”[xxviii]

While military supremacy still plays a crucial role in deterring war among major actors, however, it is not a fungible benefit and offers limited utility. Military innovations can only be used in the deterrence and application of the orthodox understandings inter-state warfare. China is, for instance, widely considered a high risk adversary. It has a large military but has also made strategic gains indirectly by using forceful means. China has reached its strategic position today by careful planning and steadily building up to avoid being noticed by stronger competitors. This is especially true for the United States. Its narrow strategic perspective limits the U.S.’ threat assessment to a very small population that is only defined by the traditional military might of a country. [xxix]

Conversely, a different understanding of the relationship between technical advancement and RMA sets a different framework; both blitzkrieg and Gerasimov doctrine indicate that a contextualized planning process which starts from operational variable analysis (e.g., adversary strategic preferences, anticipated theater of war, available means, etc…) yields more effective strategy. Planning is not based on a particular framework. It is driven by the current needs and projections of future capabilities, and not by the actual needs. In this context, the U.S. Military-industrial Complex could be redirected to disruptive innovation.

The United States must frame its operational variable analysis epistemologically in order to create a cohesive strategy that is consistently effective. This means identifying assumptions used to plan: about the U.S. strategic approach, its enemies, and the unknown qualities of other environmental variables. It is essential to understand why actors, including the U.S. operate in the manner they do, so that the United States can anticipate future events. While there is a tendency to assume that strategy follows a rational pattern of logic, there is no objective rationale by which to gauge another’s plan; that is, the actions and objectives of actors are influenced by a host of socio-cultural considerations which influence strategic preferences for ends, ways, means, and even objectives.[xxx] Planning strategies that account for all possible and likely eventualities requires you to recognize and validate assumptions. The United States can then use this foundation to explore ways it can utilize its technological prowess for its advantage, namely disruptively.

Disruptive innovations can have huge impacts on one or several aspects of society. The concept was originally used to describe the phenomenon caused by a revolutionary innovation’s potential to fundamentally alter the competitive market space,[xxxi] But it also applies to the strategic environment. It is applicable to strategic history and reflects pure RMA theory. That is, any change in society that has effected a change in the status-quo can be used by some states to their strategic advantage. Concentrating research and development efforts in technical advancements with strategic advances Relevant to the near future security scenario projections This would be more cost-effective than trying to keep defense technologies up to date with adversaries. A2/AD platforms, which can project force far beyond what would normally be possible with standard military assets, prove that there is always a way to bypass the accepted military means.

Strategists can draw many examples of RMAs to support their RMA theory. There are many examples where technology has caused RMAs, but that is not proof that all RMAs were caused by technological innovations. This assumption is not sound and it would be foolish to base a theoretical framework on it. It is better to use a more conservative approach to determining strong correlations as a strategic framework.

In conclusion, understanding what shapes strategy at the conceptual level determines a lot of an actor’s strategic process. Without an explicit epistemology, it’s difficult to innovate in strategy. I hope the wider community finds this epistemology valid or interesting enough to bring it up in the discussion.