2024 saw the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the escalation of the war in Ukraine, the sudden reignition of the Syrian Civil War, the continuation of the Myanmar Civil War, the escalation of the Sudanese Civil War, the continuation of the war in Gaza, and the conflict in the Red Sea involving the Houthis.

The year concluded with several conflicts and other powder kegs set to erupt. Here are the three places where conflict is most likely to erupt or escalate in 2025:

Syria

Few analysts predicted the dramatic jihadist offensive on Nov. 27 that ended 10 days later with the toppling of Bashar al-Assad’s government, four years after he was widely viewed as having won the Syrian Civil War. Thousands took to the streets to celebrate, inaugurating a new era in Syria.

The newfound peace is unlikely to last and hasn’t actually been fully achieved. Turkish-backed rebels joined in on the offensive and immediately began fighting the United States-backed Kurdish troops in the north.

The coalition that toppled Assad was diverse; nearly all of them fought each other as much as they had Assad, and most of them had irreconcilable differences. Marxist U.S.-backed Kurds, Al Qaeda’s former branch in Syria, assorted Islamist jihadist groups, progressive democratic rebels, Turkey, Turkish proxies, Druze militias, ISIS, and Israel now all dominate Syria. With the removal of their one common enemy, 2025 will decide whether this fragile coalition can hold.

The offensive that toppled the Assad government was led by the terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a rebrand and merger of several Islamist jihadist groups, led by the Al Nusra Front — Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. Its commander, Abu Mohammad al Julani, was originally sent to Syria in 2011 by ISIS (then ISI) Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to establish the group’s wing in Syria. Julani has rebranded himself as a moderate, insisting that his new government will be democratic and respect minorities.

Even if Julani is genuine, HTS boasts thousands of foreign fighters who traveled to Syria to fight for jihad. The initial offensive witnessed war crimes committed against Syrian Arab Army troops, including the beheading of POWs. Reports have emerged of some fighters attacking and looting Christian and Alawite villages. The jihadist fighters could grow unruly over the moderate turn of HTS and start an insurgency of their own.

The three most likely fault lines that could see the eruption of a large conflict are the Kurds versus Turkey and its proxies, jihadist fighters against the more moderate rebels, and an insurgency from Alawites and former Ba’athist members versus the new government.

The collapse of the Assad government, and with it, extensive patronage from Russia and Iran, could also open up a vacuum to be filled by ISIS.

The fall of Assad ended the first phase of the Syrian Civil War. 2025 will decide whether the fall marks the end of the war in general or merely the beginning of a new phase.

Yemen

While 2024 was marked by the defeat and humiliation of Iran and its “Axis of Resistance,” the Houthis in Yemen were a clear exception. An armada of over 20 nations failed to stop the group’s attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, with the Houthis even expanding operations to hit Israel directly with a ballistic missile.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated that Israel will shift its attention to the Houthis following the degradation of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran after the Oct. 7 massacre. In a video statement on Dec. 22 after a ballistic missile strike on Tel Aviv from Yemen, he warned, “Just as we acted forcefully against the terrorist arms of Iran’s evil axis, so we will act against the Houthis.”

Israel launched several rounds of airstrikes against Yemen in 2024, largely hitting fuel and port infrastructure in the capital of Sanaa. Netanyahu’s indication that Israel will expand operations could indicate further airstrikes in 2025 despite the difficulty involved.

The Saudi-led coalition that intervened in Yemen in 2015 could also take advantage of the weakening of Iran and its proxies to restart major hostilities against the Houthis in 2025. The U.S.-led coalition could also expand operations to make more of an effort in degrading Houthi military capabilities.

With Hamas and Hezbollah significantly degraded and Iran not at the peak of its powers, 2025 is likely to see the post-Oct. 7 wars shift to Yemen.

Balochistan – Iran and Pakistan

Balochistan is a little-known region spanning eastern Iran, western Pakistan, and southern Afghanistan. It is inhabited by the Baloch people, a unique nomadic ethno-linguistic group. Iran and Pakistan have struggled with insurgencies from the group for decades, embittered over a sense of disenfranchisement.

The insurgency has been led by the Balochistan Liberation Army, but the primarily Sunni Balochistan has also served as a stronghold for ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other jihadist groups in recent years. Militants have targeted Iranian and Pakistani military personnel, civilian infrastructure, non-ethnic Balochs living in the region, foreign diplomats, and Shiites, and in recent years, they have expanded to attacking Chinese contract workers. The attacks on Chinese contract workers were particularly alarming for the Pakistani government, as it threatened to demolish a $60 billion Chinese investment project.

Chatham House noted a distinct shift in the Balochistan insurgency in 2023, noting better organization and effectiveness. This can largely be credited to an influx of educated middle-class professionals, who have increased the popular appeal of the insurgency. It has also expanded beyond radical militants, with an accompanying civil society movement with even wider popular appeal.

The recent inclusion of women in the typically male-dominated movement has also increased its popularity. In April 2022, a Baloch woman with a graduate degree in medicine killed three Chinese students at the University of Karachi in a suicide bombing attack.

The increased effectiveness of the insurgency has resulted in a change in strategy from the Iranian and Pakistani governments. Accusations of harboring Baloch militants to attack the other country peaked in January when the two countries exchanged missile and air strikes. Seemingly at the brink of war, the two countries suddenly reversed course to instead cooperate against the insurgency. The security forces of the two countries have begun conducting joint operations to fight Baloch militants.

Pakistan declared an anti-insurgency operation in June 2024. Fighting has continued throughout the year, but the increasing effectiveness of the insurgency, the participation of Iran, and the heavy-handedness of the military’s tactics could exacerbate the situation. Several factors point toward the likelihood that the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan and Iran could reach new levels of violence in 2025, causing further problems for the embattled governments of the two countries.