How Russia Decides to Go Nuclear

Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine last February, there has been a near-constant debate about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear arsenal—and what he might do with it. The United States has warned repeatedly that a Russia flustered may be open to using nuclear weapons.The Kremlin has raised the possibility of a nuclear attack several times. Top U.S. officials claim that senior Russian military officers have discussed when and how they might use nuclear weapons. These concerns led to China and other countries close to Russia warning Moscow not to go nuclear.

This conflict has not seen the use of the ultimate weapon, and it is hoped that it will never. It is not possible to know if Russian leaders considered it an option, or if it was Western signaling which convinced Moscow to avoid such a dramatic choice. As long as tensions continue to be high between Russia, NATO, and other countries, there will not be any chance of a Nuclear war The problem persists and leaders from the U.S., Europe and other countries must think about how to stop the Kremlin using its missiles. To do this, they must understand the protocols that govern Russia’s nuclear weapons.

All nuclear-armed countries have to balance two competing imperatives. They must ensure that weapons are not used without authorization, and keep them in constant readiness. They come up with unique command-and control systems that can affect nuclear decision making. Russia has to sign off multiple officials in order to command the use nuclear weapons. This is not the US system where the commander in Chief has complete control. That said, the Russian military has a disproportionate impact on nuclear policy; there are few outside analysts who can sway the Kremlin’s decisions on nuclear weapons. And although the system by which nuclear commands are issued is strictly centralized in Russia, the command and control of low-yield—or so-called tactical—nuclear weapons creates particular challenges for Western policymakers seeking to prevent Russian nuclear use.

It is more difficult for Western policymakers today to determine whether Moscow has ordered a nuke launch or if it is simply signaling. This makes it harder to devise policies to mitigate a strike. But given Moscow’s protocols, the West should pay attention not only to Putin but also to Russia’s military leaders when thinking about Russia’s nuclear weapons. The West should also convey the significant risks and costs that increased nuclear signaling—and actual use—entails in order to deter Russia. Ultimately, the ambiguity of Russia’s doctrine and protocols means that nuclear use would create a deeply dangerous situation that neither side may be able to control.

CHECKS & BALANCES

The United States can declare nuclear war without supervision. In the United States, however, this is not true. Russia. The Russian constitution, the country’s defense laws, its military doctrine, and its formal principles on nuclear deterrence do say that only the president can order the use of nuclear weapons in combat and that only the president can order a nuclear weapons test. Yet all public accounts of Russia’s nuclear command-and-control system indicate that the president needs the consent of other key officials before the military can follow through on any nuclear command.

Putin, like his American counterpart, has a “nuclear briefcase” that he keeps with him at all time. But so do two other people: Sergei Shoigu, RussiA’s defense minister, and Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the military’s general staff. An order must pass from both Putin’s briefcase and the briefcase of one of the other two military officials before Russia can use nuclear weapons. Gerasimov’s sign-off is especially important, and perhaps even essential. Any nuclear order must be authenticated through a central nuclear command post of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, which is under the direction of Gerasimov’s general staff.

As with many aspects of Russia’s nuclear strategy, these checks and balances were inherited from the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders sought to ensure that no single person—an aging Communist Party leader, for example, or one suffering from dementia—could unleash nuclear Armageddon on a whim. However, there are also the System Was designed To stop the Military It cannot order strikes by itself. According to all public sources, the Russian president must be involved in a nuke order.

Few people are more familiar with this protocol—and its evolution—than Putin. Russia’s president has been personally involved in nuclear planning for over 20 years, overseeing a major overhaul of Russia’s nuclear strategy in 1998, which increased the role of nuclear weapons in the country’s military preparedness. He then served as the chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the secretary of the Russian Security Council, positions in which he saw Russia’s nuclear policies up close. Putin can rattle off theories and facts about Russian nuclear strategy during press conferences and events, even if they seem unscripted.

Putin is the most familiar with Russian nuclear protocol.

Putin’s statements on nuclear doctrine reflect the positions of the Russian military, which is where the country’s current nuclear planners and policymakers all reside. There is no think tank, no Russian equivalent of the RAND Corporation, that can raise substantive challenges to Russian nuclear strategy, and so general staff and scientists dominate the country’s nuclear debates. Putin, of course, could have opinions of his own, and he could solicit input from members of his closest circle—such as Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council. But the views of the armed forces will most closely inform Putin’s nuclear decisions.

If Putin would seriously consider Nuclear Shoigu and Gerasimov would be his advisers. They are both old-timers under his regime and have his trust. In response, Gerasimov’s staffers (who oversee nuclear planning in Russia) would provide the three leaders with key aspects of current policy and ongoing debates about What The political consequences that nuclear weapons could have on the world’s political landscape and at what cost would be devastating. The staff would then Take the following steps: A recommendation On Whether Russia should launch an attack You can also reserve this option for later. If they were required to give options, or recommend nuclear use, they would likely offer detailed advice. What kind of attack? Consider which weapon to use, which type of target you want to hit, and where it should be conducted. Also, consider the potential consequences.  

So far, the Russian military’s nuclear strategists have been mostly preoccupied with how important these weapons would be in convincing a technologically advanced adversary—specifically NATO—to give up its objectives in a war with Russia. Not coincidentally, Russian doctrine calls for nuclear use in a conflict that could threaten Russia’s very existence. Russian leaders, including Putin have made it clear that they support nuclear use in a conflict that could threaten Russia’s very existence. Ukraine invasion It is not the type This is Russia could use nuclear weapons in a war.

However, Russian military doctrine This doctrine does not provide any guidance on the current situation in Ukraine. However, it states that Russian conventional forces should be capable of winning this type of war. Due to large-scale Western arms transfers, Russian forces find themselves facing an adversary that is better equipped than they had anticipated. Analysts are now asking whether Russian losses in Crimea (for example) will be compensated. Russian strategists Reconsider the threshold to use Nuclear weapons.

CHAIN REACTION

The Russian military’s underperformance in Ukraine raises questions about whether Russia’s nuclear arsenal would perform any better. Despite the setbacks on the battlefield, there is good reason to believe that it would. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces—which include the big, extraordinarily destructive, long-range weapons that menace even the United States—have for decades been the most prioritized part of the military, and experts generally consider them to be in better shape than any other part of the armed forces. But they are not likely to be used against Ukraine. Their main purpose is to deter Western countries from getting involved in the ground effort to help Kyiv. This has not been a complete success. NATO has been deterred from meddling directly in the conflict, yet despite Russia’s nuclear threats, NATO countries are providing Ukraine with an ever-expanding portfolio of sophisticated armaments.

If Russia was to seriously consider using nuclear weapons, it would be a different story. UkraineIt would be more likely to turn to its sub-strategic nuclear arsenal. These nuclear weapons are mounted on land-, sea- or air-based platforms and travel shorter distances that the strategic arsenal. These warheads have a lower impact and a range of yields that can reach from one to several hundred thousand kilotons. For comparison, the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima produced a yield of approximately 15 kilotons. This means that these weapons can do minimal damage to the battlefield and could potentially devastate entire cities.

A tactical warhead would still be ordered by the president or one of his top military officers. But beyond that step, there is less available public information about this part of Russia’s nuclear protocol than there is about the procedures guiding the country’s larger weapons. Protocols surrounding low-yield weaponry are more likely have changed since the incident. Cold WarRussian doctrine opened up more scenarios for nuclear use. The authorization of, for example, is most likely to be granted. Nuclear Use is now separate from early warning systems that detect an approaching missile attack against Russia. This means that the country appears more comfortable than ever being the first to use nukes in a conflict.

The military’s relative sanity may not hold.

Russia still maintains tight political control over its nuclear weapons. This is accomplished by the civilian Ministry of Defense’s 12th Directorate, a unit that The Russian nuclear warheads are stored in centralized storage locations under physical control. This directorate would install warheads on missiles capable of firing nuclear weapons if Russia decided to use them. Many of the potential nuclear warhead-carrying missiles have been tested in Ukraine. These include ground-based, short range Iskander missiles and sea-based Kalibr cruise bombers.

Western policymakers are on the lookout for any practical evidence that Russia is moving to use such weapons—indeed, CIA Director William Burns According to him, watching for such indicators is a major responsibility. However, the observation of nuclear activity does not necessarily mean that Russia has decided to use a weapon. Nuclear weapon. Russia carried out a nuclear deployment procedure testing in 2013 to signal to the West that its willingness to increase the nuclear ante. However, such activity would indicate that a nuclear attack could be possible. Western Ukrainian leaders could then make efforts to persuade Russian officials not to follow their lead. These are examples These are the steps These steps could include notifying Russian military and political leadership of the potential risks associated with such an action. These are just a few of the many steps. Could also Include military signaling to support any messaging. They could also include increasing Moscow’s pressure through coercive methods, such as cyberattacks.

These efforts will only be successful if the Kremlin is open to being deterred. It would also depend on Moscow’s ability to reliably return weapons to centralized storage after they arrive on the field, or whether it can withdraw an order to launch a missile already issued to a commander on the field. Russia appears to be familiar with take-back procedures and has demonstrated this in the 2013 exercise. However, such an order would not be possible in Russia. It would in any other nuclear weapon state. For Western interlocutors, this uncertainty makes it harder to convey critical redlines about Russian nuclear use to the Kremlin’s leaders and to determine what could be done to stop the country from using nuclear weapons once they had left storage.

FINE LINES

Officials from the West hope that they will never be faced with a Russian nuke attack. Putin seems to still believe conventional weapons can win a victory in Ukraine. And although he has the most power over Russia’s nuclear arsenal, Putin would have to consult with his defense advisers, who could break with the president over any mooted strike. While Russia seems to be convinced that Russia should have nuclear weapons ready for any potential war with NATO, the military is adamant that Russia should not. This is something Moscow wants desperately to avoid but which could lead to a conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The military’s relative sanity, however, may not hold in the face of more significant Russian losses—such as a successful Ukrainian campaign for Crimea NATO-supplied weaponry to support major Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s homeland. The West has so far managed to strike a delicate balance between providing Ukraine with substantive capabilities and avoiding the provision of battle systems that could provoke a confrontation with Moscow. As Ukraine develops and improves its capabilities the West will need to adjust its policy. Should continue to try to understand where Russia’s redlines are. Otherwise, it may well be that they discover Moscow’s thresholds only after they have been crossed.

The moment when Ukraine is close to victory will be the most dangerous. Putin thinks he can save his invasion only by an unprecedented escalation. But this is not the end of the story.Another Perilous moments will soon come If Russian military and political leaders have decided that direct military confrontation with NATO was inevitable. This is the second contingency West policymakers should actively try to avoid, using calibrated communication and military maneuvers which cannot be misinterpreted in preparations for an operation against Russia.

It is unlikely that Russia will win the war of aggression in Ukraine with a nuclear attack. Moscow’s theory about first use—that it will force a terrified Ukraine and a shaken West to sue for peace instead of continuing to fight—is unlikely to be borne out. The Ukrainians are determined to continue fighting at all costs and more horrors will only increase their determination. The West will not allow Putin to use nuclear weapons in order to conquer the world. This would be a horrible precedent. It will force them to intensify their efforts to make Russia pay for its aggression.

Russian nuclear use in Ukraine, or anywhere else, would result in terrible destruction. This would put both the Russian and Western decision-makers in uncharted territory. The United States would have to make difficult decisions about a variety of issues, including how much punishment and political denunciation should be applied. NATO will have to come up with a solution. To de-escalate this situation from the most dangerous time in modern history, leaders around the world would need to use their statecraft to calibrate.

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