Watchdog: Iran capable of making 10 nukes in 4 months.

As Biden releases $6 billion to Tehran, its weapon capacity expands

Iran now has the capacity to fuel 6 nuclear warheads in 1 month’s time, and 10 within 4 months, according⁤ to ⁣an analysis of ​the latest data released by a nuclear watchdog.

Iran has the resources and ‍technical know-how to “produce enough [weapons-grade uranium] for six nuclear weapons⁢ in⁣ one month, eight in two​ months, nine in three⁤ months, and ten in four‌ months,” ‌ according to the ⁣Institute for Science and International Security,​ a ‌think tank that reviewed the latest disclosures about Tehran’s atomic stockpile from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

This is significantly‍ faster‍ than the three-to-four months ‍it would have⁤ taken Iran to build just one nuclear⁢ weapon in 2020 when ⁣economic sanctions were at their strictest before the ​Biden administration took office. Now, it would take⁤ Iran just 12⁢ days to produce the fuel needed for its first nuclear warhead and a total of six ​by the ‍end‌ of one month. This also is an ⁢increase from May 2023 estimates​ when it was thought⁣ Iran‍ had ‍enough uranium to power five nuclear weapons.

Iran has been growing its ‍stockpile of highly enriched​ uranium since President Joe Biden ‍took office and restarted diplomacy over a revamped‌ version of the 2015 nuclear pact.⁤ In addition to not enforcing key sanctions ⁣on Iran—providing‌ it access to nearly $45‌ billion ‌in oil​ revenue—the ‍administration recently freed up an ⁣additional $16 billion, a portion of ‍which was the result ⁣of a hostage deal with the hardline regime.

“Washington’s⁣ de-escalation policy has ​clearly⁣ failed,” said Andrea Stricker, ‌a veteran ⁤nuclear analyst who worked‌ on the latest analysis⁢ about Iran’s current nuclear capacity. “Iran has ​amassed enough enriched uranium since May—after the negotiation of the alleged​ de-escalation deal—to⁤ grow⁤ its breakout capability from eight nuclear weapons to ‍ten weapons.”

Analysts‍ at the Institute for Science and International Security⁣ are also concerned that “this breakout could be⁣ difficult for the IAEA to detect promptly, if Iran delayed inspectors’ access,”⁤ as it⁢ has ⁣done in the past.

Within the second month of crossing the nuclear threshold, Iran could use its remaining stockpile of ⁤highly enriched uranium to produce ⁢”an ⁤additional two weapons,” according ​to the⁤ institute’s findings.

Although Iran has slightly⁢ slowed its enrichment of uranium and downgraded some of its stores, neither ‌move has “improved the breakout‍ situation; in fact, the​ situation⁢ worsened,”⁤ according to the report.

Iran also obfuscates a portion ‍of its nuclear ​work⁢ from international inspectors.

“For more than two and a half years⁤ Iran has not provided updated declarations and the Agency ‍has not ‍been able to conduct any‍ complimentary access‍ … to any‌ sites ​and locations in Iran,” the ⁤IAEA reported.

Because Iran is⁢ preventing the installation‍ of “monitoring and surveillance ​equipment,” the IAEA doubts “its ability to ascertain whether Iran has diverted⁣ or may divert advanced centrifuges,” the machines that enrich uranium to levels needed for a weapon, according to the Institute. “A ⁢risk is that Iran‍ could accumulate a secret stock of advanced [nuclear enrichment] centrifuges, deployable in the future‍ at a clandestine enrichment plant or during a breakout at⁣ declared sites.”

“Another risk,”‌ the group reported, “is that Iran will establish ⁢additional centrifuge manufacturing sites unknown to the ‍IAEA.” Iran has already ⁢”proven its ⁤ability to move manufacturing equipment to new, undeclared sites, further complicating any future‍ verification effort and contributing ⁢to uncertainty⁣ about where Iran ‌manufactures centrifuges.”

This uncertainty highlights⁢ Iran’s efforts to hide a portion of its enrichment capability from ​the international community. Already, “Iran is⁣ building a new ​facility in the‌ mountains ‌near [the] Natanz‌ [nuclear facility] ​ that is deeply buried and could be a potential site⁢ for a new enrichment ‌plant.”

Iran’s decision to remove the IAEA’s surveillance and monitoring equipment from several sites has impeded the agency’s “ability to provide assurance of the⁣ peaceful⁤ nature of Iran’s nuclear program.”

In the face ⁤of these moves, the Biden administration is seeking a ⁢nuclear deal with‌ Iran that will free⁢ up billions more for⁣ the regime, assets that are likely to be ‌used to strengthen the country’s nuclear⁣ program and military.

The only barrier to a deal is Congress, though lawmakers ⁣have not demanded an Iran policy briefing from ‌the Biden administration since⁢ May.

“Together with Republicans, Senate Democrats must⁤ do the difficult⁣ thing: oppose Biden’s new agreement‌ and stop the hemorrhaging⁤ of leverage and financial resources to Iran,” said Stricker, who is also a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank. ​”Those funds enable Tehran’s nuclear build-up and terrorist activities, while rewarding the regime for⁤ arming Russia‌ against⁢ Ukraine.⁤ How bad must things get before⁣ Congress intervenes?”