Is Turkey’s Future in NATO an Asset or Liability?

Conservative News DailyJanuary 5, 2023

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Turkey’s Future in NATO: Asset or Liability?

Paul J. David – Justus
Paul J. David-Justus is an Assistant Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction and is a current doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. His views are his alone.

Introduction

A dispute in the Aegean sea regarding offshore energy exploration rights led to Greece and Turkey narrowly avoiding war in September 2020. This near-miss propelled Athens to pursue a military modernization program over the fear of a possible future escalation with Ankara—an ally ostensibly committed to Greece’s defense.^[1]

This incident was not isolated. It followed the Trump administration’s leveling of sanctions against Turkey for its acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system in contravention of U.S. concerns, as well as its assault on U.S.-backed Kurdish militias in Syria.^[2] This is also happening against the background of an intensifying internal crackdown by Turkish President Recep Takyip Erdogan in the recent years. It has seen mass arrests, erosion of the rule-of-law, and marked rises in the power of Presidency. Further, Turkey has threated to veto Sweden and Finland’s applications for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership amid Russia’s unjust, irredentist invasion of Ukraine, delaying the addition of two strategically valuable members to the Alliance in a bid to gain political concessions.

Cumulatively, these developments have raised questions about Turkey’s future in NATO, with some officials and commentators doubting the value of its continued participation in the bloc.^[3] Yet, such a move would be an unprecedented decision for the Alliance—and a potentially catastrophic one. This raises serious concerns about NATO’s integrity and its true purpose.

Turkey’s Historic Role in NATO

Anxiety among Western powers over Soviet expansionism in Europe peaked following World War II as a result of the Soviet Union’s overwhelming conventional military superiority in Europe, Moscow’s reluctance to disarm following the conclusion of hostilities, and the establishment of satellite governments beholden to Moscow in Eastern and Central Europe.^[4] NATO was established in 1949 to protect Western liberal democracies and establish a unified framework to allow for military cooperation and collective defense.^[5] NATO’s commitment to democracy preservation is affirmed in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that members are. “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”^[6] Further, Article V proclaims that an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all members, and every member is obligated to take action—including but not necessarily the use of armed force—to restore peace to the treaty area.^[7]

As a result of the spreading of communism and Soviet power in Europe as well the ongoing Greek Civil War, Turkey’s ascension to NATO was a natural outcome. If the Greek communists had won, Turkey would be located between Soviet-dominated nations on its eastern or western borders. This would make it unable to resist Soviet pressure in future. As part of its early implementation of the Truman Doctrine to limit Soviet influence, the U.S. approved $400m in military and civil assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1947.^[8]

Turkey’s strategic geopolitical position played the greatest role in the decision to send it aid and later incorporate it into NATO. Considering the Soviet Union’s overwhelming conventional superiority in Europe, U.S. military planners assumed that Soviet forces had a realistic chance of overrunning the continent. Maintaining air superiority in such a conflict scenario would be crucial for slowing the Soviet advance, highlighting Turkey’s potential contribution. Western air force forces could attack Soviet oilfields in Romania and the Caucasus, which would limit the Soviet ability to wage offensive war.^[9] Turkey was seen as a crucial first line of defense against Soviet aggression due to its shared border with the Soviet Union, its border with Soviet-aligned Bulgaria and its ability to control access to the Black Sea via its Turkish Straits. Because of these factors, cooperation between Turkey and the West would cause the Soviets to divert Western Europe’s military assets to the Turkish theater, reducing its ability to concentrate forces in one region.^[10] NATO members recognized the importance of Turkey’s contribution to the Alliance and agreed to accept Turkey (along with its regional rival Greece) into the bloc in 1952.^[11]

Nonetheless, Turkey’s Cold War tenure in NATO did not go without controversy. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 to protect the Turkish minority on the island. The result was an armed conflict that Turkey won between Greece and Turkey. Turkey has a small enclave in the island. The Cypriot Crisis marked a low point in Turkish-NATO relations. This incident also exposed the uncomfortable question of NATO’s response if two members of NATO went to war.^[12]

NATO had to reevaluate their mandate after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. Although Article V was not invoked during the Cold War, the Alliance’s collective efforts prevented the Soviet Union from launching a war on Europe.^[13] The Alliance was not threatened by an external threat because its members shared democratic values. This created a standard for other members to follow.^[14] NATO approved the NATO Strategic Concept of 1991. Management of crisesDefinition of “” “the management of crises affecting the security of its members.”^[15] This change in approach caused division in the Alliance as members had to agree to use force to create peace conditions and enforce peace settlements in conflicts where no member was attacked.^[16] NATO launched its first non-Article V operation in a non-Article V situation management mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a response to gross human rights violations in 1995.[17]

In 2010, crisis management was extended to include a combined response to all levels of crisis. This includes crisis prevention and post-conflict stabilization.^[18] NATO also adopted a new Strategic Concept that year. “Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members.”[19] This clearly reaffirms the importance of the Alliance’s shared, founding values as the fabric that binds members together, but it also underscores that the fundamental purpose of NATO is the common defense of its members.

Turkey is still an important member of the Alliance, both in operational and quantitative terms. It has the second-largest army and third-largest civilian population in NATO.^[20] The bloc’s geopolitical advantage still gives it a strategic advantage, because it borders important areas like Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Ukraine is located to its north, across Black Sea. Turkey also serves as part of America’s extended deterrent in Europe, reportedly housing U.S. nuclear weapons at its Incirlik Air Base.^[21] Over time, however, shifting political currents within Turkey itself have given rise to doubts about the country’s reliability and suitability in the NATO alliance.

Trends in Turkish Policy

Over the past two decades, Turkey’s relationship with the West has changed fundamentally. In a break from the country’s historical reliance on the U.S. and Europe for both inspiration and security, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made clear that he seeks to make Turkey a great standalone power.^[22] In the early 2000s, Turkey was in the early stages of applying to be a member of the European Union, appeared to be willing to compromise on the Cyprus issue, and aimed to make inroads with the country’s Kurdish minority. These efforts failed, but Erdogan’s subsequent internal political moves to consolidate power resulted in the erosion of the secularity of state institutions and the rollback civil liberties.^[23]

After the failed coup against Erdogan in 2016, these trends were intensified. Internal crackdowns on the government opposition led to 150,000 people being expelled from state institutions and 50,000 arrests. Erdogan loyalists were elected to replace the military and judicial officers accused of complicity in the coup.^[24] Erdogan obtained the power through a continuous state-of-emergency declaration and a constitution referendum to unilaterally appoint loyalists high-ranking officials and judges, and to severely limit press freedoms.^[xxv] These actions raised concerns among U.S. officials and European officials about the situation in Turkey regarding democracy and human rights.^[xxvi]

Turkey’s foreign policy has also become a cause of concern for other NATO members. Ankara’s decision to acquire Russian-made air defenses over U.S. and NATO objections, for instance, has raised worries over potential security risks to the Alliance.^[27] Turkey was also removed from the U.S. F-35 programme and was subject to sanctions by the Trump administration in 2020. Turkey has also granted the Russian air force overflight rights, thus facilitating Russia’s activities in Syria and Libya.^[28] Further, Turkey violated an arms embargo on Libya’s Government of National Accord by shipping armaments and trainers by air and sea. This led to numerous standoffs between French and Turkish navies.^[29] Turkey favors a solution that involves two states to the Cyprus problem. This is in contrast to abandoning the idea of a single state. “dialogue and compromise” Approach common to its European neighbours.^[30] Likewise, Turkey’s energy exploration activities brought itself and Greece to the brink of war in 2020.^[31] Further, Turkey’s priorities in its response to the Syrian Civil War have at times diverged from those of the United States and NATO. Like its allies, Turkey supported defeating the Islamic State, and it continues to oppose Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government. Still, it also wants to prevent the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) from gaining political autonomy due to their connections to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)—a Kurdish terrorist organization. This led to Turkish incursions in northern Syria and clashes directly with the YPG.^[32]

One area of Turkey’s foreign policy of particular interest to NATO has been its response to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Ankara has taken on the role of mediator in this conflict. Turkey has a strong partnership with Russia, including its acquisition of weapons and its acceptance of Russian military planes to transit Turkish airspace in support of Russian forces in Syria. Turkey also rely on Russia for roughly half of its natural gasoline imports.[33] Turkey is a strong supporter for the Ukrainian struggle to self-determination. It has supplied arms to Kyiv—most notably the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 series drone that has provided Ukraine with precision airstrike capabilities with great effect against Russian forces.[34] At the outset of Russia’s invasion, Turkey invoked its rights under the Montreux Convention of 1936 and closed off the Turkish Straits to transiting warships, preventing Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea naval forces.[35] Through its unique position, Turkey has already shown success by helping mediate a United Nations-backed deal between Moscow and Kyiv that facilitates Ukrainian grain and fertilizer exports through Russia’s Black Sea blockade.[36] This unique position may prove to be a benefit in future negotiations. However, it has caused some problems for NATO in this crisis. A particular point of contention is Ankara’s threat to veto Sweden and Finland’s applications to join NATO—which require the approval of all current members of the Alliance—over their decisions to harbor individuals allegedly associated with the PKK and their decisions to ban arms exports to Turkey in response to its military operations in Syria. This threat was largely dropped following a June 2022 memorandum of understanding among the three countries that commits Sweden and Finland to resolve these discrepancies, but Erdogan stated in October 2022 that Turkey’s consent for their NATO ascension will not come until those commitments come to fruition.[37]

NATO: An Alliance of Values or Defense

The trendlines above have contributed to growing concern over—and declining confidence in—Turkey’s role in NATO. Turkey has been criticised as a democracy, for example. “backslider” That challenges the ideological foundations the Alliance.^[38] This criticism centers on the idea that NATO is not unified by a common threat. Instead, it is bound together by its shared commitments to democracy, human rights and the rule of the law. The preamble of the Alliance’s founding treaty and its 2022 Strategic Concept explicitly declares the commitment of members to these values.[39] As a result, if a NATO member fails to share this commitment in practice, then it undermines the rationale for the Alliance’s continued existence. Furthermore, if a NATO country does not uphold these values, how can it expect the bloc to rely on them to take part in collective action to protect them beyond an Article V scenario. From this perspective, Turkey should be disciplined or removed from NATO for failing to uphold the Alliance’s values.

NATO is not a union of liberal democracies, but it has been a diverse alliance with countries that have maintained excellent human rights records. Portugal, a founding member of NATO, had an authoritarian government up until 1974. Between 1967 and 1974, Greece was ruled by a military dictatorship.^[40] The civilian government in Turkey was overthrown multiple times by the country’s military. Some have also expressed concern about modern Turkey by referring to Hungary and Poland, both of which are democratic. “backsliders.”^[41]

Prioritizing the importance of common values among members could lead to ignoring the consequences for punishment or exclusion for nonconformist members. As it stands, NATO has no de-accession criteria and there is no roadmap to expel members. It is unlikely that such a mechanism will be created, as it would require consensus from all members.^[42] Such pressure can convince people who are considered to have a problem. “backsliders” To form a group Within Alliance that would seriously hamper consensus and break down internal standards

A more pragmatic approach would place a higher value on NATO’s fundamental purpose: a defensive military pact, whose strength lies in the converging security interests of its members.^[43] If a member no longer finds common ground with the collective on this front—or worse yet, is actively endangering the security of other members—then it should either withdraw itself or be coerced into doing so. Turkey is not yet eligible for expulsion.

Turkey’s Future in NATO

Despite recent instances of cooperation, Turkey’s relationship with Russia does not represent a fundamental realignment in its foreign policy. Instead, current interactions between Moscow and Ankara have a transactional and tactical nature. It continues to actively oppose Russia on many fronts, including in Syria.^[44] Libya,^[45] Ukraine^[46] Still, this does show Turkey’s willingness to work alongside NATO’s key strategic adversary, potentially to the detriment of the Alliance’s goals and security. This relationship should be closely monitored, even at a transactional level.

However, U.S.-Turkey’s and NATO-Turkey’s relationships are still strategic and enduring.^[47] While Turkey’s divergent approach to the Syrian Civil War reflects a break with its NATO allies, throughout the conflict it has not questioned the value of NATO as an institution.^[48] Turkey actually called NATO in 2013/2015 for assistance as a response to the threat to its civilian population. Turkey continues to be proud of its NATO membership.^[49]

The most concerning element of Turkey’s foreign policy is its standoffish behavior towards its NATO allies. What would the Alliance do in the event of another conflict between Greece or Turkey? The treaty seems to lack any answers, other than opposing who shot first. Pursuing amicable solutions to the division of Cyprus, energy exploitation rights in the Aegean Sea, and the longstanding negative Greek-Turkish relationship is a daunting task, but allowing these issues to continue to fester threatens the Alliance’s viability as an effective force for collective action.

Despite Turkey’s concerning behavior, the case for it remaining in NATO is strong. Turkey is committed to NATO’s core mission as a collective security pact. Turkey’s geopolitical position has never been more relevant than during the Cold War. The Alliance’s largest military and the fact that it is the only country with a Muslim majority are important assets for emergency response operations in many theaters. Further, Ankara’s exit alone would do little to address current or future nonadherence to the Alliance’s values as Turkey is seen by some as not the only democratic “backslider” In the bloc. A longer-term solution would entail the implementation of a mechanism to eject members that fail to comply with the Alliance’s values and standards of conduct; however, achieving the consensus of all NATO members to this end would be unlikely to succeed in a meaningful way. Positive inducements and punitive diplomatic measures outside NATO’s organizational structure may be the only tools presently available to encourage a change of behavior in wayward members. It is possible that Turkey will be able to agree to mutual defense without jeopardizing Alliance security. However, this makes it more of an asset rather than a liability.

[1] Helena Smith “Greece and Turkey resume talks to try to avert military escalation,” The GuardianAvailable at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/25/greece-and-turkey-in-talks-to-try-to-avert-military-escalation.

[2] Lara Jakes, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Turkey Over 2017 Purchase of Russian Missile Defenses,” The New York Times, December 14, 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/politics/trump-turkey-missile-defense-sanctions.html.

[3] Tim Ogden’s example is Tim Ogden. “It’s time to expel Turkey from Nato,” The Spectator, October 30, 2020, available at https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/it-s-time-to-expel-turkey-from-nato. Doug Bandow also available. “Transatlantic Alliance Mistake: Turkey Isn’t Worthy of NATO Membership,” CATO Institute, November 13, 2019, available at https://www.cato.org/commentary/transatlantic-alliance-mistake-turkey-isnt-worthy-nato-membership#; and Rep. Eric Swalwell’s comments in Tal Axelrod, “Democratic lawmaker: Expelling Turkey from NATO ‘should be on the table,’” The Hill, October 15, 2019, available at https://thehill.com/homenews/house/465847-democratic-lawmaker-expelling-turkey-from-nato-should-be-on-the-table.

[4] Lord Ismay “NATO: the First Five Years 1949-1954,” NATO, 1954, available at https://archives.nato.int/uploads/r/null/2/1/216977/NATO-The_first_5_years_1949-1954__by_Lord_Ismay_.pdf. pp. 3-6.

[5] Andrew R. Hoehn & Sarah Harting “The NATO That Once Was,” In NATO at Risk: Afghanistan Testing the Limits, 5–12, RAND Corporation, 2010, p. 5, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg974af.9.

[6] Lord Ismay. op. cit., p. 17.

[7] Ibid., p. 18.

[8] Ibid., p. 6.

[9] Melvyn Leffler “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952,” The Journal of American History 71, no. 4 (1985): p. 814, available at https://doi.org/10.2307/1888505.

[10] Ibid., pp. 817-823.

[11] Ibid., pp. 822-824.

[12] Frances G. Burwell and W. Robert Pearson “TURKEY AND NATO: NEW IMAGES AND OLD QUESTIONS,” THE EVOLUTION OF u.s. TURKISH RELATIONS INSIDE A TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXTStrategic Studies Institute, US Army War College 2008, p. 64. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12097.8.

[13] “Crisis Management,” NATO, October 8, 2020, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm.

[14] Celeste Wallander, “NATO’s Enemies Within,” Foreign AffairsAvailable at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/natos-enemies-within.

[15] “Crisis Management,” NATO, op. cit.

[16]Andrew R. Hoehn, Sarah Harting, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[17] “Crisis Management,” NATO, op. cit.

18 Ibid.

[19] “Strategic Concept,” NATO, November 19-20, 2010, p. 35, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

[20] Adam Taylor “Turkey’s Increasingly Complicated Relationship with NATO,” Washington PostAvailable at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/19/turkeys-increasingly-complicated-relationship-with-nato/.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Soner Cagaptay, et al., “Erdogan’s Empire: The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy September 29, 2019, available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/erdogans-empire-evolution-turkish-foreign-policy.

[23] Amanda Sloat and Kemal Kisci “The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey: Implications for the West,” Brookings, February, 2019, pp. 1-3, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/FP_20190226_turkey_kirisci_sloat.pdf.

[24 Ibid., pp. 2-7.

[25] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

[26] See, for example. “2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey,” U.S. Department of State, 2021, available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/turkey/. Also see “Key findings of the 2021 Report on Turkey,” European Commission, October 19, 2021, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_5282.

[27] Carlotta Gall, “Turkey Get Shipments of Russian Missile System, Defying U.S.,” The New York TimesAvailable at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/world/europe/turkey-russia-missiles.html?searchResultPosition=1.

[28] Marc Pierini & Francesco Siccardi “Why the EU and the United States Should Rethink Their Turkey Policies in 2021.” Carnegie Europe. January 21, 2021. Available at https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/01/21/why-eu-and-united-states-should-rethink-their-turkey-policies-in-2021-pub-83662.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Helena Smith, op. cit.

[32] Can Kasapoglu? “Turkey’s Military Policy in Syria: Implications for NATO,” NATO Defense College, 2020, pp. 3-4, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23668.

[33]Esra Çuhadar and Juan Diaz-Prinz, “To Sustain Hopes for Peace in Ukraine, Keep an Eye on Turkey,” United States Institute of Peace, April 28, 2022, available at https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/sustain-hopes-peace-ukraine-keep-eye-turkey.

[34] Steven Witt “The Turkish Drone That Changed the Nature of Warfare,” New Yorker, May 9, 2022, available at https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish-drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare.

[35] Al Jazeera, “Russia cancelled Black Sea passage bid of four warships: Turkey,” Al JazeeraAvailable at:, March 2, 2022 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russia-cancelled-black-sea-passage-bid-warships-turkey.

[36] Tara John Armstrong and Cecelia Armstrong “Ukrainian grain deal ‘lays groundwork for permanent peace environment,’ says Turkey,” CNN, 20 August 2022, available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/20/europe/ukraine-grain-shipments-turkey-un-intl/index.html.

[37] VOA, “Turkey’s Erdogan Renews Threat to Block NATO Bids by Sweden, Finland,” VOA, October 1, 2022, available at https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-erdogan-renews-threat-to-block-nato-bids-by-sweden-finland/6771840.html.

[38] Nathalie Durhin. “NATO and Its Founding Values: Renewal of Vows or ‘Conscious Uncoupling’?” Edited and authored by Stephen J. Mariano. NATO’s Strategic Foundations: Values, Deterrence, and Arms Control. NATO Defense College, 2020, p. 11, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26057.6.

[39] “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,“ NATO, June 29, 2022, p. 1, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf.

[40] Celeste Wallander, op. cit.

[41] Judy Dempsey “NATO’s Bad Apples,” Carnegie Europe, April 03, 2018, available at https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75962.

[42] Judy Dempsey (op. cit.

[43] Nathalie Durhin. op. cit., p. 12.

[44] Jim Zanotti, Clayton Thomas “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief,” Congressional Research Service, December 30, 2021, p. 13, available at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44000.pdf.

[45] Ibid., p. 15.

[46] Andrew E. Kramer, “Turkey, a Sometimes Wavering NATO Ally, Backs Ukraine,” The New York TimesAvailable at:, February 3, 2022 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/world/europe/ukraine-turkey-russia-drones.html.

[47 Kamal A Beyoghlow, “TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND THE US-TURKISH STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PARTNERSHIP,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2020, p. 75, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24340.

[48] Can Kasapoglu (op. cit., p. 4.

[49] Ibid., p. 4.

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