The Best Way To Rebuild Our Navy Is To Privatize It

The U.S. Navy isn’t just for fighting overseas or protecting the homeland. It’s also a basic tool of force projection, diplomacy, and protecting and regulating international trade. But today’s Navy is too small to meet the demands placed on it. As a result, traditional Navy tasks, such as enforcing sanctions, are far down the priority list. But this capability gap could be filled if we had the boldness to bring back privateers.

During the long response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and the delusion of the peaceful rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the U.S. Navy was allowed to atrophy. One tangible consequence: Today, America reportedly has no aircraft carriers dedicated to deterring an increasingly bellicose China — they’re all either in the Middle East, headed to the Middle East, or in various stages of training or repair. 

Navies aren’t cheap. Modern ships take a long time to build — at least in the West; the PRC seems to be building dozens of warships quite quickly — and the U.S. defense industrial base needs billions to even begin to ramp up production. So our Navy will be too small for at least a decade.

Using Privateers to Combat Russia’s Ghost Fleet

Economic warfare has become a central component of international relations, though overused and ineffective unless assiduously enforced. The U.S. and its allies sanctioned Russia’s oil exports after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. To get around those sanctions, Russia operates a ghost fleet of oil tankers. These aging tankers sail without traditional insurance and with obscured ownership. 

In February, the U.S. blacklisted 14 Russian tankers operated by Sovcomflot, a state-run shipping company. It doesn’t appear that the blacklisting has had any practical effect, as there is no record of any ship being impounded. But declaring sanctions and then not diligently enforcing them erodes U.S. credibility — and, with it, deterrence.

It was estimated that 196 tankers loaded with crude oil left Russian ports last December alone, with most of the ships flying flags of convenience from Panama, Gabon, and Liberia. As the ships pass near European powers, they’re often escorted by Russian warships, but then they’ll “go dark” — turning off their transponders as they link up with other vessels to transfer the oil or offload it in ports where the adherence to rule of law is a bit spotty. 

If the U.S. truly wants to shut down Russia’s ghost fleet, it should consider an old but effective tool: privateers. Bringing back privateers, sanctioned under the U.S. Constitution, to target the Russian ghost fleet can bolster national security while the U.S. fleet is rebuilt. This approach, grounded in historical precedent and legal framework, would enhance U.S. strategic flexibility, especially if paired with a policy that promoted American energy dominance.

Historical and Legal Context of Privateering

Privateering has a rich and storied history. Some 500 years ago, European nations issued letters of marque to supplement their naval forces. The practice allowed private individuals and ships to capture enemy vessels and cargo, effectively outsourcing naval warfare. 

Privateers played a significant role in American history, particularly during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, where they disrupted British supply lines and captured valuable prizes. The last time the United States used privateers was during the War of 1812 — though the Confederacy employed the practice in the Civil War. 

The practice waned in the mid-19th century, largely due to the Declaration of Paris in 1856, in which the major European powers and subsequently other nations agreed to ban privateering. However, the U.S. did not ratify the treaty. Of note, America saw its small Navy, relative to the European powers, as a reason to keep its options open. 

The U.S. Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11), providing a legal foundation for privateering. This concept remains an option under U.S. law. 

Private military contractors are well-suited to undertake privateering missions. The private sector’s agility and operational capabilities complement traditional military efforts. Privateers, if legally empowered to capture vessels violating sanctions, could retain the seized assets and auction off the contraband oil. This financial incentive would attract skilled operators and enhance enforcement effectiveness.

Incentivizing U.S.-Flagged Shipping

Engaging privateers to target the Russian ghost fleet could also have the secondary effect of incentivizing international shippers to register under the U.S. flag. The prospect of U.S. Navy protection against potential retaliation by Russia or other adversarial powers would be a significant draw for these companies. Currently, U.S.-flagged vessels are entitled to the protection of the U.S. Navy, providing a security assurance that can be crucial in unstable maritime environments. 

This shift could bolster the U.S. merchant marine fleet, enhance national security, and ensure better compliance with international laws and sanctions. Moreover, a larger U.S.-flagged fleet would create a more robust logistical network — absolutely vital in deterring the PRC across the vast expanse of the Pacific. 

Energy Dominance and Economic Stability

Energy dominance is crucial if America is to mitigate the effects of international market disruptions on fuel prices and inflation. The strategic deployment of privateers against the Russian ghost fleet would be supported by energy dominance. If the supply of illicit Russian oil shipments is interrupted, the international price of oil would likely increase in the absence of new supply. American energy dominance could fill the gap, stabilizing crude oil markets and prices at the pump. 

The recent depletion of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) under the Biden administration, aimed at tempering fuel prices ahead of the 2022 midterm elections, underscores the need for a robust energy strategy. Energy dominance would allow for a cost-effective refilling of the SPR. 

American energy dominance extends beyond domestic economic stability. Europe’s reliance on Russian energy has long been a point of leverage for Moscow. By curbing the ghost fleet’s operations and enhancing U.S. energy exports, the U.S. can undermine this leverage — a critical factor in geopolitical dynamics — as well as strengthen energy ties with allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The reintroduction of privateers, authorized under the U.S. Constitution, offers a solution to a costly problem that won’t soon be solved: a U.S. Navy that lacks the power to meet its commitments.