The Russia-Ukraine War of 2022 – What We Have Learned

Conservative News DailyDecember 31, 2022

The Russia-Ukraine War in 2022 Comes to an End A recent New York Times expose on Russia’s military performance in the war’s opening rounds describes an army that was grossly ill-prepared for modern combat. Although the Ukrainian side has been rightly praised for its ability to fight in modern combat, courage and tenacityIt has also made numerous egregious mistakes. It is important to reflect on the following: performance of the two armies – and the support provided by their many backers – into context for clues as what 2023 may hold.

[embedded content]

While the outcome can’t be predicted with any certainty, Washington is obligated to form the best policy possible, in this dynamic and unstable situation, to give our country the best chance at ensuring the interests of the United States are assured, no matter how the conflict is eventually resolved. The good news is Washington has within its power – at the moment – to virtually guarantee the U.S. remains secure, prosperous, and free.

This confidence can be found in the fact that the U.S. Armed Forces have the most powerful air, land, water, and space forces anywhere on the planet. We have the human capital and the natural energy and financial resources to create and sustain the necessary military capabilities to protect America from any potential aggressors.

We must be careful not to let our resources become a source of endless foreign policy support. This is why it is so important that Washington thoroughly weighs any potential missions or policies, and does a detailed cost-benefit assessment. Stretching ourselves too thin globally – or foolishly stumbling into a war with Russia – could place our security at unnecessary risk. It is imperative to establish well-thought defense priorities, as demonstrated by the conflict in Ukraine.

This is the first part of a trilogy that will analyze the war to close 2022. These analyses will evaluate the current status of the war, examine where it might lead in the first half 2023, and, most importantly, consider how Washington can and should ensure that U.S. vital national interest are protected regardless of how the war unfolds.

Russia’s Opening Disaster

Earlier this month, the New York Times published an extensive analysis of the reasons for Russia’s many military failures in the opening phases of its war with Ukraine. The article was simply called “Putin’s War,” The assessment outlines six main reasons why the Russian military failed to achieve its initial war goals. The most important were a) operational, strategic, and tactical blunders; and b) arrogance of Russian leaders; and c) institutional rot from the pre-war army buildup.

As I’ve covered many times in these pagesRussia made many avoidable, egregious mistakes at tactical, operational and strategic levels. The training of tank crewmen was poor. The small unit commanders did not seem to have a basic understanding of combat tactics. Higher ranking commanders decided to break up the limited Russian troop numbers into four axes. This was a violation of one of the fundamental principles of war: massing effect. They divided their force by 4, giving Ukraine the time it needed to survive the first blows.

Russian leaders at the strategic level set themselves up to fail by assuming they would win quickly, and having no viable options. ‘plan B’ Keep your contingency plans ready. It is important to understand that war plans can go awry when the enemy makes contact. Commanders need to anticipate setbacks, unexpected victories, and have contingency plans prepared and practiced. Moscow doesn’t appear to have had a strategic reserve so that if one or more of the axes got bogged down, they could reinforce it with a reserve to push through and secure the objective. All four axes met unexpectedly strong resistance, and there weren’t combat-ready units to assist any axis.

As disastrous, Russia’s most senior commanders failed to anticipate a tough, extended fight and thus launched the offensive with vastly insufficient stocks of ammunition, spare parts, fuel, and other required items necessary to sustain combat. In September, Putin accepted that the initial force allocated to the mission would not succeed and ordered the creation of a new force. partial mobilization. But the Kremlin had been caught flat-footed again, and didn’t have anywhere near enough equipment to outfit 300,000 new troops, didn’t have their training base resourced with supplies or even instructors, and had not prepared the hundreds of armored vehicles mobilization required which were still in storage.

Russia started to learn from mistakes early but did so at a snail’s pace. Russia suffered one its worst tactical defeats in the third month of war when it attempted to cross the Donets River using a large armoured force. Poor tactical planning and execution led to a devastating defeat for the unit when Ukrainian forces were defeated. nearly 500 Russians In one operation. Russia was eventually able to recover, force other river crossings and, by the start of July, had taken control of the major cities. Mariupol, SeverodonetskAnd Lysychansk. However, these successes came at a steep price.

They were exhausted because Russian strategic leaders refused to mobilize additional troops even though it was obvious that the approximately 200,000 troops they had allotted for the invasion would not be sufficient. It would take them months to recover and replace their losses. They could only rely on a small number of volunteers. Ukraine profited again from the error and began to prepare for a late summer secretly twin offensive They are theirs.

Recent interview with Gen. Oleksandr, commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Syrsky said All of Ukraine tactical “success are due to the face that we never go head-on” The Russians. He demonstrated the effectiveness of this tactic in the Kharkiv area, the northern region of the twin offensives. Since April, Russia had manned the Kharkiv region with an economy-of-force mission whereby they keep just enough troops in an area to prevent the enemy from flanking their main force (which was the Kremlin’s focus on the Donbas). In yet another failure, however, Russian leaders became fixated on the fighting the main effort and missed Syrsky’s forces massing for a strike.

Ukraine’s southern prong of its twin offensive was in the Kherson region. Initial progress by the Ukrainian troops was slow, and they suffered. very high casualties While gaining little ground. Russia had been prepping for the well-publicized attack, and had initially mounted a strong defense. But Syrsky’s surprise offensive in the Kharkiv region caught the small Russian force – the BBC estimated the UAF outnumbered the Russians 8-to-1 – and routed them. The UAF had regained its independence by October. thousands of square kilometers & driven the Russians back home the Kreminna-Svatovo line.

Meanwhile, the southern wing of the attack took advantage of Russia’s now divided focus and put renewed pressure on the city of Kherson. Russia had spent months strengthening Kherson’s defenses in preparation for an attack. But their efforts had been hampered by the relentless Ukrainian campaign of interdicting supply lines across Dniper River. Russia wouldn’t be able to maintain a defense without this campaign.

The new Russian campaign commander, Gen. Sergey Surovikin, eventually won the “difficult decision” To withdraw his troops Kherson Instead of fighting for it. At the end of October, Ukraine had both won and lost against Russia in the south and north. But just as Russia’s summer offensive came at great cost, so too did Ukraine’s fall offensives.

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, apparently accidentally let slip that Ukraine had lost on November 30 100,000 soldiers killed Since the war began. Kyiv protested and denied the report. a mere 13,000. The official casualty number is not known, even though it seems unlikely that it would be so low. Yet regardless of what the actual number of dead and seriously wounded is, the impact has been significant on Kyiv’s troops.

Since making major gains in October and November, Ukraine’s offensives eventually ran out of steam and the front has generally stagnated along a line near Svatovo in the north, Bahkmut in the east, and the Dnipro River in the south. As 2022 winds down, both presidents are meeting with their senior commanders to consider what moves they’ll make as 2023 opens. Part II of the study will discuss all options for each military.

Contributing Editor at 19FortyFive Daniel L. Davis He is a Senior Fellow in Defense Priorities, and a former Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army. He has been deployed to combat zones four times. He is also the author of “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis