Could the NCAA conference switcheroo disrupt college football?

College⁢ football starts its season this⁢ weekend, with a partial slate of games ahead of a full launch over the ⁣Labor Day⁢ weekend. It’s the start of a⁤ season that will begin undoubtedly ‍the biggest transition in⁢ the sport’s history.

When‌ last on ‍the national stage⁤ in January, the ​sport‌ already faced major ⁣challenges, from athletes getting paid for their name, image, and likeness, to players transferring from school to school, to ​the expansion of a postseason playoff. ⁢And the past eight months have seen those challenges only shift into hyperdrive.

College football is ​in the midst of a series of evolutions ⁤so dramatic as to comprise a ⁤revolution, such that ⁣the ​sport that kicks off one ⁢year ‌from now, in September ⁣2024, will look​ dramatically different, particularly⁢ off the​ field, from the setting of just a few years ago. But the larger forces that sparked these changes are themselves ​in flux, so much so that⁤ the ⁤forces that “blew​ up” college football may not exist a few ‍years from now.

A Historic Conference Realignment

In January, we already knew that four major powerhouses would switch conferences ⁢in the ​fall of 2024. Texas⁤ and⁢ Oklahoma had committed to switch from the Big 12 to the Southeastern Conference, while West Coast universities​ USC and UCLA had announced their move to the Big Ten, a conference​ traditionally ⁢based among the Great⁢ Lakes⁤ states (and ⁣which has had more than 10 ‌members for three decades).

But the past few⁢ weeks have seen the implosion ​of the PAC-12, the Pacific Athletic Conference. Following‌ the ⁤announced departure of USC and UCLA, fellow PAC-12⁤ members Oregon ‍and Washington also decided to depart for the Big Ten this summer. Colorado announced it would leave the conference to⁤ join the Big 12,‌ a⁣ conference to which fellow PAC-12 schools Arizona, Arizona⁤ State, ⁤and Utah also decamped in short⁣ order.

The ‌rapid-fire game of ‌musical chairs left the PAC-12, a century-old major conference of West Coast schools, withering on the vine with ⁢only four ⁢schools remaining. And‌ it left institutions around the country in a “semipublic panic,” ⁢as they ‍feared being left without ​a proverbial dance partner.

Following the Money

The moves ⁢left traditionalists lamenting the loss‍ of geographic⁢ rivalries in a sport that heretofore had its roots in regional conferences. It also had many critics noting⁢ that football programs are determining the future of ‍college athletics as a whole.

The‌ conference realignments won’t ⁣just affect ⁣football teams, which generally only ⁢play 12 regular-season games, ​but athletes in other sports as well. For ⁢instance, athletes at USC or UCLA who play sports like volleyball or baseball more than once a‍ week may not appreciate⁣ the inconvenience of having to travel to “conference” games in places​ like College Park, Maryland, or Piscataway, New Jersey, ​instead of ⁢in-state locales like‍ Berkeley or Palo Alto.⁣ And the added travel costs could put pressure on university athletic budgets such that institutions end up culling programs in less-popular sports.

At its bottom, the‌ conference realignment was sparked‍ by a dash for television cash. Colleges⁣ scrambled to ⁤get the biggest network rights offering they could receive from its conference affiliation, which is virtually always connected to the strength of a conference’s ⁢college football programs, rather than its basketball or other sports‍ offerings.

When the PAC-12 reportedly turned down a television offer from ESPN last year, ‍and the offers ‌this year proved minimal⁤ and desultory, it had effectively sealed its own fate.⁢ The schools that could get ‌better offers‍ elsewhere left, while those that couldn’t were ⁢left high‌ and dry.

Disappearing Cash ⁢As Cable TV Declines

School presidents have rationalized this‍ game of “Musical Conferences” ​on the grounds that the additional⁣ television money from a better‌ conference affiliation‍ will ⁤help ​their schools and athletic programs. But those rationalizations could ⁤disappear in relatively short order,‌ given⁤ the changing media landscape.

Consider the plight of Walt Disney affiliate ESPN,‌ whose base of cable subscribers has shrunk from ⁣100 million down to 70 million and is set to shrink further as more households “cut​ the cord” of the traditional cable bundle. ESPN has thus far‍ sought to​ overcome subscriber losses by ⁣raising its ‍cable rights fees, trying​ to squeeze‌ more dollars out‍ of a shrinking customer base.

But at some point in the not-too-distant future, that strategy will collapse, and neither⁢ Disney nor‌ ESPN has figured out what to do when ⁤it does. To ‌survive as‌ a standalone ​product, ESPN may need to charge streaming customers as much as $40-50 per month — far more than most streaming ‌services currently charge and perhaps more than⁤ the market will bear. ‌The quandary has ⁢left Disney CEO Bob Iger to suggest selling or spinning off ESPN and ABC,​ because he, like other media ‍executives, has‍ yet to figure⁣ out how to make a profit in a world ​of streaming ‌video.

Virtually all sports are hostage to the conundrums faced by a changing media landscape. Only the NFL, with⁣ its massive fan base and more limited schedule (17 weekly ⁣games versus 162 for ⁤Major ⁤League Baseball), can air all its games on traditional over-the-air network television. Every other sports league is, to ​a ⁢greater or lesser degree, dependent upon cable television coverage and therefore hostage ‍to the current ⁣tug-of-war between cable and mobile streaming.

In theory, streaming ‌services ‌that are part of⁣ larger conglomerates — think Apple TV or Amazon Video — might face fewer cost pressures ⁤because‍ the non-video portion of the business ⁤can ‍subsidize streaming sports content. But ⁣few​ executives will want one ⁤segment of their ⁢business ‍to sustain‌ billions of ⁤dollars in losses forever,⁤ meaning that big streaming services may ⁢not ⁤give sports‌ leagues the major rights fees that they have heretofore commanded from cable networks.

Through the⁤ latest bout of conference realignment,‍ university presidents may have blown up not just college ⁤football, ⁤but university athletics in general. And they may have ⁤done ​so to chase a pot of ⁢gold that could prove ephemeral and fleeting.

Rather than speaking to the ‍relative weakness ‌of its ‍football programs, the PAC-12’s inability to find a lucrative television rights offer⁤ may instead stand as a signal warning of what all conferences may face ‍a few years from now. In that case, college football faces an even more uncertain future than many fans think.